

Supplementary Materials for “Redistricting Reforms Reduce Gerrymandering by Constraining Partisan Actors”

Cory McCartan*

Department of Statistics
Pennsylvania State University

Christopher T. Kenny

Data-Driven Social Sciences
Princeton University

Tyler Simko

Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

Emma Ebowe

Department of Government
College of William and Mary

Michael Y. Zhao

Harvard College

Kosuke Imai

Department of Government
Department of Statistics
Harvard University

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*To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: mccartan@psu.edu. Website: <https://corymccartan.com/>. Address: 461 Pollock Road, University Park, PA 16801.

S1 Details of institutional coding

This appendix details the coding of each state's redistricting processes. The actual coded variables for each state in 2010 and 2020 are shown in Table S1.1.

S1.1 Summary of encoding

Below, we provide a simplified summary of the coding, prior to the full details of the coding scheme.

S1.2 Variable coding

Drawer. What kind of body draws the maps?

- **Legislature:** The state legislature directly draws the maps. *Example:* Florida 2020.
- **Commission:** Embodies any type of commission, including independent commission, bipartisan commission, or a legislative commission. *Example:* California 2020 had an independent commission.
- **N/A:** There is no redistricting. *Example:* Wyoming 2020 only has one congressional district and so does not redistrict.

Drawer Control. Who effectively controls the map-drawing body?

- **Democrats.** *Example:* Nevada 2020 had Democratic majorities in both chambers of the state legislature.
- **Republicans.** *Example:* North Carolina 2020 had Republican majorities in both chambers of the state legislature.
- **Split:** The map is drawn by the legislature, and partisan control of the legislature is split across both chambers. *Example:* Minnesota 2020 had a Democratic majority in the state house and a Republican majority in the state senate, so the legislature was under split partisan control.
- **Nonpartisans:** The map-drawing body is composed of people chosen through nonpartisan or explicitly bipartisan means. *Example:* California 2020 had an independent commission.
- **N/A**

Veto 1. Who has veto power over the proposed maps?

- **Legislature:** The legislature can choose to adopt or substitute their own maps for those presented to it by the initial map drawers. *Example:* Iowa 2020. The legislature can veto the commission's maps.
- **Governor.** *Example:* Alabama 2020.
- **Voters:** Maps can be subject to public referendum. *Example:* California 2020.
- **N/A:** No body has veto authority, or the map drawer has the votes/ability to override vetoes. *Example:* Kentucky 2020. Though the governor has statutory authority to veto maps from the legislature, the legislature had a Republican supermajority that overrode the Democratic governor's veto.

Veto 1 Control. Who controls the body with veto 1 power?

- **Democrats.** *Example:* Illinois 2020. The Democratic governor can veto the legislature's plan.
- **Republicans.** *Example:* Georgia 2020. The Republican governor can veto the legislature's plan.
- **Split:** The veto power is held by the legislature, which is split in its partisan control across both of its chambers. *Example:* Washington 2010. The legislature has veto power over the commission's maps, but the legislature was under split partisan control.

- **N/A:** No body has veto authority, or the map drawer has the votes/ability to override vetoes. *Example:* Tennessee 2020. The legislature has a Republican supermajority, and though the Republican governor has the statutory authority to veto maps, a supermajority renders this power effectively moot.

Veto 2. Who else has veto power over the proposed maps?

- **Governor.** *Example:* Iowa 2020. After the legislature receives maps from the legislature and approves a set of maps, the governor can veto the redistricting bill.
- **N/A**

Veto 2 Control. Who controls the body with veto 2 power?

- **Democrats.** *Example:* Maine 2020. The Democratic governor can veto the plan from the commission which was approved by the legislator.
- **Republicans.** *Example:* Iowa 2020. The Republican governor can veto the plan from the commission which was approved by the legislator.
- **N/A:** No body has veto 2 authority, or the map drawer has the votes/ability to override vetoes. *Example:* Utah 2020. The legislature (which has veto power over the commission) has a Republican supermajority, and though the Republican governor has the statutory authority to veto maps, a supermajority renders this power effectively moot.

Court Review. Is there a legal avenue for map challenges to partisan gerrymandering in state court? (Rudensky, 2023; Wang et al., 2019; Douglas, 2014)

- **Yes:** Clear enabling provisions in state law or constitution OR a legal challenge brought at any point in the past which was not dismissed. *Example:* New Mexico 2020. A state court accepted (but ultimately denied) a lawsuit from the New Mexico GOP challenging Congressional lines as a partisan gerrymander.
- **Maybe:** Possible enabling provisions in state law or constitution AND no legal challenge brought at any point. *Example:* South Carolina 2020.
- **No:** No enabling provisions in state law or constitution; or legal challenge clearly dismissed. *Example:* Kansas 2020. The State Supreme Court ruled that the use of partisan factors in redistricting is constitutionally permissible.
- **N/A**

Note that court review is a hidden variable that is not clear until a legal challenge is actually brought forth and either succeeds or is rejected. Indeed, even the specter of litigation may influence how other actors in redistricting approach the drawing of maps. When legal challenges were brought forth for the first time in a state in the 2020 redistricting cycle and the relevant laws under which the court ruled were in place in the 2010 redistricting cycle, we retroactively apply the permissibility of court review to the 2010 cycle as well under the assumption that had a challenge been brought in 2010, it would have proceeded the same way.

Court Control. Which party controls the state supreme court (or equivalent)? (Parker, 2023)

- **Democrats.** *Example:* Illinois 2020.
- **Republicans.** *Example:* Indiana 2020.

- **Split:** Equally divided court during the window for which challenges could have been brought for 2012 and 2022 maps. *Example:* Nevada 2020.
- **Nonpartisans:** Supreme court is truly nonpartisan, not just having nonpartisan elections. *Example:* South Carolina 2020.
- **N/A**

Stalemate 1. Who decides the outcome if the initial map drawer has a stalemate?

- **Court:** Court has statutory power to intervene in the event of a stalemate. *Example:* New Jersey 2020.
- **Commission.** *Example:* Oregon 2020.
- Commission Staff. *Example:* Colorado 2020.
- **Unclear:** no clear statutory or constitutional provision. *Example:* Louisiana 2020.
- **N/A**

Stalemate 1 Control. Who controls the initial stalemate outcome?

- **Democrats.** *Example:* Maine 2020. The Maine Supreme Court, which can intervene in stalemates, is controlled by Democrats.
- **Republicans.** *Example:* Indiana 2020. The Indiana Supreme Court, which can intervene in stalemates, is controlled by Republicans.
- **Split:** Stalemates are broken by a body that must have bipartisan support. *Example:* Ohio 2020. Stalemates are broken by a backup commission with the support of at least two members from each party (see exceptions below.)
- **Nonpartisans:** includes any type of commission selected in a nonpartisan or explicitly bipartisan way. *Example:* Oregon 2020.
- **N/A**

Stalemate 2. Who decides the outcome if the first stalemate-breaking body itself has a stalemate?

- **Court:** Court has statutory power to intervene in the event of a stalemate. *Example:* Connecticut 2020.
- **Legislature.** *Example:* Ohio 2020.
- **Unclear.** *Example:* Minnesota 2020.
- **N/A**

Stalemate 2 Control. Who controls the second stalemate outcome?

- **Democrats.** *Example:* Connecticut 2020.
- **Republicans.** *Example:* Ohio 2020.
- **N/A**

Final Drawer. Who drew the map in place for the 2012 or 2022 election cycle?

- **Legislature:** Includes re-drawing a remedial map after court challenges. *Example:* South Carolina 2020.
- **Commission:** Includes re-drawing a remedial map after court challenges. *Example:* Washington 2020.
- **Governor.** No example available.

- Court master: Court ordered a special master to draw the final plan. *Example*: Pennsylvania 2020.
- Court D remedy: Court picked a remedial map from a Democratic-affiliated plaintiff or intervenor. *Example*: Colorado 2020.
- Court R remedy: Court picked a remedial map from a Republican-affiliated plaintiff or intervenor. No example available.
- N/A

Preclearance. Was any part of the state subject to DOJ preclearance in 2010 (prior to *Shelby County v. Holder*)? (U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2013)

- **Yes.** *Example*: Georgia 2010.
- **No.** *Example*: Massachusetts 2010.

S1.3 Notes on coding

Most criteria are straightforward, and the information for coding can easily be found in public data for each state. Furthermore, most states have similar redistricting policies that are easily classified under the categories we defined earlier. However, there are unique exceptions that we will treat below. In particular, we coded the below issues as follows.

Veto overrides.

- In Kansas 2020, Kentucky 2020, Louisiana 2020, Maryland 2010, Maryland 2020, Massachusetts 2010, Massachusetts 2020, Montana 2020, New York 2020, Rhode Island 2010, and Rhode Island 2020, the legislature had the necessary supermajority to override any vetoes, so we coded the governor's veto as N/A.

Unique commission compositions.

- In Idaho in 2010 and 2020, commissions are re-formed upon stalemate. Members are picked by both parties in a way that forms a 3-3 even split from both parties, except that the State Supreme Court picks the members of the commission if the parties don't decide in time. We code the control of this commission as having a partisan split.
- In Indiana in 2010 and 2020, stalemates are broken by a five-member backup commission composed of the majority leader from each house, the chair of the redistricting committee from each house, and a state legislator appointed by the governor. Since both houses and the governorship were controlled by Republicans, we coded this commission as being controlled by the Republican party.
- In Michigan 2020, if the commission does not adopt a final plan, a plan is randomly chosen. We code this as a stalemate 1 breaker by the nonpartisan commission.
- In Ohio 2020, if the legislature fails to redistrict by bipartisan majorities, the work falls to a commission that must approve a map by a bipartisan vote. The commission is composed of appointees by state executive officers and legislative parties. If the commission cannot do so, it can pass a map by a majority vote without bipartisan support, but the map only lasts two election cycles instead. This is encoded as a draw by a split state legislature with the first stalemate broken by a nonpartisan commission and the second stalemate broken by Republicans, since Republicans control all state executive offices and have a functional majority on the commission.

Courts.

- In Kansas in 2010, the legislature failed to redistrict, and a federal court stepped in to draw the maps instead. But since this was not done under any statutory power and only done once, we consider this an exception to the normal redistricting process in Kansas rather than a procedurally institutionalized stalemate breaker. Similarly in Wisconsin in 2020, the State Supreme Court approved “least change” maps drawn by the governor after a stalemate, but we coded the stalemate as unclear for the same reasons.
- On the other hand, in Minnesota in 2010 and 2020 we have coded the court as a stalemate breaker because it has consistently intervened in previous stalemates.
- In Minnesota in 2020, a court-appointed panel drew the final map. We code this as equivalent to that of a court master.

Relevant history that did not affect encoding.

- In North Carolina, the 2012 map was ultimately struck down but only after the election. Furthermore, the 2022 map was an interim plan only used for the 2022 election.
- In Virginia in 2010, the state legislature initially deadlocked, but drew a map in time after state legislative elections in 2011. Thus, the stalemate procedure for 2010 was coded as unclear.

Table S1.1: Institutional coding for all states.

State	Year	Drawer	Drawer control	Veto 1	Veto 1 ctrl.	Veto 2	Veto 2 ctrl.	Court review?	Court control	Stalemate 1	Stalemate 1 ctrl.	Stalemate 2	Stalemate 2 ctrl.	Preclearance
Alabama	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Alabama	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Arizona	2010	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Arizona	2020	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Arkansas	2010	legislature	democrats	governor	democrats	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Arkansas	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
California	2010	commission	nonpartisans	voters	NA	NA	NA	yes	republicans	court	democrats	unclear	NA	yes
California	2020	commission	nonpartisans	voters	NA	NA	NA	yes	democrats	court	republicans	unclear	NA	yes
Colorado	2010	legislature	split	governor	democrats	NA	NA	yes	democrats	court	democrats	unclear	NA	no
Colorado	2020	commission	nonpartisans	court	democrats	NA	NA	yes	democrats	commission staff	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	no
Connecticut	2010	legislature	split	NA	NA	NA	NA	no	democrats	commission	nonpartisans	court	democrats	no
Connecticut	2020	legislature	split	NA	NA	NA	NA	no	democrats	commission	nonpartisans	court	democrats	no
Florida	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Florida	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	yes	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Georgia	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Georgia	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Hawaii	2010	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Hawaii	2020	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Idaho	2010	commission	split	NA	NA	NA	NA	yes	republicans	commission	split	unclear	NA	no
Idaho	2020	commission	split	NA	NA	NA	NA	yes	republicans	commission	split	unclear	NA	no
Illinois	2010	legislature	democrats	governor	democrats	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Illinois	2020	legislature	democrats	governor	democrats	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Indiana	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	commission	republicans	unclear	NA	no
Indiana	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	commission	republicans	unclear	NA	no
Iowa	2010	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	no	republicans	legislature	republicans	unclear	NA	no
Iowa	2020	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	no	republicans	legislature	republicans	unclear	NA	no
Kansas	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Kansas	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Kentucky	2010	legislature	split	governor	democrats	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Kentucky	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Louisiana	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Louisiana	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Maine	2010	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	split	governor	republicans	no	democrats	court	democrats	NA	NA	no
Maine	2020	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	split	governor	democrats	no	democrats	court	democrats	NA	NA	no
Maryland	2010	legislature	democrats	governor	NA	voters	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Maryland	2020	legislature	democrats	governor	NA	voters	NA	yes	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Massachusetts	2010	legislature	democrats	governor	NA	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Massachusetts	2020	legislature	democrats	governor	NA	NA	NA	maybe	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Michigan	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Michigan	2020	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	yes	democrats	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	yes
Minnesota	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	democrats	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	court	republicans	unclear	NA	no
Minnesota	2020	legislature	split	governor	democrats	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	court	democrats	unclear	NA	no
Mississippi	2010	legislature	split	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Mississippi	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Missouri	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Missouri	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Montana	2020	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Nebraska	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Nebraska	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Nevada	2010	legislature	democrats	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Nevada	2020	legislature	democrats	governor	democrats	NA	NA	no	split	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
New Hampshire	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	democrats	NA	NA	no	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
New Hampshire	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
New Jersey	2010	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	no	republicans	court	republicans	NA	NA	no
New Jersey	2020	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	no	democrats	court	democrats	NA	NA	no
New Mexico	2010	legislature	democrats	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
New Mexico	2020	legislature	democrats	governor	democrats	NA	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
New York	2010	legislature	split	governor	democrats	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
New York	2020	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	democrats	governor	NA	yes	democrats	legislature	democrats	unclear	NA	yes
North Carolina	2010	legislature	republicans	NA	NA	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
North Carolina	2020	legislature	republicans	NA	NA	NA	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Ohio	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	voters	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Ohio	2020	legislature	split	governor	republicans	NA	NA	yes	republicans	commission	split	legislature	republicans	no
Oklahoma	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	NA	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Oklahoma	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Oregon	2010	legislature	split	governor	democrats	NA	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Oregon	2020	legislature	democrats	governor	democrats	NA	NA	yes	democrats	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	no
Pennsylvania	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Pennsylvania	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	democrats	NA	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Rhode Island	2010	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	democrats	governor	NA	no	split	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Rhode Island	2020	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	democrats	governor	NA	no	split	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
South Carolina	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
South Carolina	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Tennessee	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	NA	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Tennessee	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Texas	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Texas	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Utah	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	NA	NA	NA	no	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Utah	2020	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	republicans	governor	NA	no	nonpartisans	legislature	republicans	NA	NA	no
Virginia	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Virginia	2020	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	split	NA	NA	no	nonpartisans	court	nonpartisans	NA	NA	yes
Washington	2010	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	split	NA	NA	yes	nonpartisans	court	democrats	NA	NA	no
Washington	2020	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	democrats	NA	NA	yes	democrats	court	democrats	NA	NA	no
West Virginia	2010	legislature	democrats	governor	NA	NA	NA	no	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
West Virginia	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Wisconsin	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Wisconsin	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	democrats	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no

S2 Redistricting Game Specification

The game tree is specified in Figure 3 in the main text and is described in the theoretical modeling section. Here we detail the parametric specification of the moves by nature, starting with the post-enactment court review process. The parameters in the model all receive probabilistic priors, rather than being fixed to specific values. These priors place most of their mass across a broad range of plausible values, based on our experience and observation of past redistricting processes.

S2.1 Post-enactment processes

We decompose the court challenge process into five components, as follows:

1. The probability a legal challenge is possible, which depends on the data coding, is specified as

$$\text{pr_chal_poss} = \begin{cases} \text{chal_poss_conf} & \text{if Court Review is coded as "Yes"} \\ \text{chal_poss_maybe} & \text{if Court Review is coded as "Maybe"} \\ 1 - \text{chal_poss_conf} & \text{if Court Review is coded as "No"} \end{cases}$$

The prior on chal_poss_conf is $\text{Beta}(19, 1)$ and the prior on chal_poss_maybe is $\text{Beta}(6, 14)$. The effect of this setup is to follow the treatment coding closely but allow for some uncertainty in the possibility of court review, rather than, e.g., precluding any possibility of court challenge in a state because it was coded as “No.” State courts may change their interpretations of state laws and constitutions in any given case.

2. The probability a challenge is made when one is possible, which depends on the extremity of the partisan bias of the first enacted plan, x . Let $F(x) = \pi^{-1} \arctan(x) + \frac{1}{2}$ be the CDF of a standard Cauchy distribution. The specification of this probability is then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{pr_chal_if_poss}(x) &= F(a + bx^2) \\ a &= F^{-1}(\text{chal_prob_bias}_0) \\ b &= (F^{-1}(\text{chal_prob_bias}_2) - F^{-1}(\text{chal_prob_bias}_0))/2^2. \end{aligned}$$

The general form of $F(a + bx^2)$ means that the probability of a challenge will be U-shaped, asymptotically approaching 1 as the absolute partisan bias increases. For interpretability, the scale and shift coefficients are parameterized in terms of the probability of a challenge when the first enacted plan has bias 0 and the probability of a challenge when the first enacted plan has bias 2. These parameters receive $\text{Beta}(4, 16)$ and $\text{Beta}(17, 3)$ priors, respectively. Figure S2.1 shows 200 draws of the induced prior on pr_chal_if_poss .

3. The probability a court sides with plaintiffs challenging the first enacted plan, i.e., that the court intervenes, which depends on the partisan bias of the first enacted plan as well as the partisan makeup of the state supreme court. We assume that courts with a partisan majority are more likely to intervene and find in favor of challengers when the partisan bias of the first enacted plan is opposite in sign to the court’s partisan lean. Let $g(x; a) = x^2(0.7 + ac \cdot x + (0.2x)^2)$, with $c = \sqrt{4(2 \cdot 0.7)(12 \cdot 0.2^2)}/6$, which is a convex quartic with asymmetry controlled by a parameter a ; the value c is set so that the discriminant of the second derivative is positive, i.e., that the quartic is indeed convex. Then the intervention probability is

$$\text{pr_intervene}(x) = \begin{cases} bc \cdot g(-x; \text{interv_asym}) + ac & \text{if Court Control is coded as "Democrats"} \\ bc \cdot g(-x; \text{interv_asym}) + ac & \text{if Court Control is coded as "Republicans"} \\ ac + bcx^2 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},$$




Figure S2.1: 200 draws from the prior on the $\text{pr_chal_if_poss}(x)$ curve.

with

$$\begin{aligned} a &= F^{-1}(\text{interv_prob_bias}_0) \\ b &= (F^{-1}(\text{interv_prob_bias}_2) - F^{-1}(\text{interv_prob_bias}_0))/2^2 \\ c &= \text{interv_prob_max} \end{aligned}$$

The coefficients on the quartic g were adjusted so that the average value of g across the interval $[-4, 4]$ was close to the average value of x^2 across the same interval. Like the challenge probability, the general form of $F(ac + bcx^2)$ means that the probability of intervention will be U-shaped, asymptotically approaching $c = \text{interv_prob_max}$ as the absolute partisan bias increases. The use of g means that the probability of intervention will be asymmetric around 0 for partisan courts. The maximum interv_prob_max has a Beta(18, 2) prior; the asymmetry parameter has a Beta(4, 1.5) prior; the relative probability of intervention for a neutral plan, $\text{interv_prob_bias}_0$, receives a Beta(4, 16) prior; and the relative probability of intervention for a plan with bias 2, $\text{interv_prob_bias}_2$, receives a Beta(18, 2) prior. 200 draws of the induced prior on pr_intervene for each type of court control are shown in Figure S2.2.

4. The expected remedy a court orders when siding with plaintiffs, which depends on the partisan bias of the first enacted plan as well as the partisan makeup of the state supreme court, and is specified as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{court_outcome}(x) &= \frac{\text{out_nonp_bias}_2}{\arctan(2/2)} \cdot \arctan(x/2) + a \cdot \text{out_nonp_part_adv} \\ a &= \begin{cases} -1 & \text{if Court Control is coded as "Democrats"} \\ 1 & \text{if Court Control is coded as "Republicans"} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

The out_nonp_bias parameter governs the partisan bias of a nonpartisan court remedy when the partisan bias of the first enacted plan is 2 (hence the subscript); it receives a folded Normal prior with mean 0 and standard deviation $\frac{1}{2}$, i.e., we simulate from $\mathcal{N}(0, \frac{1}{2})$ and then take absolute values. The out_nonp_part_adv parameter controls the additional partisan lean of the remedy towards the party that controls the court, where applicable; it receives a folded Normal prior with mean 0 and standard




Figure S2.2: 200 draws from the prior on the $\text{pr_intervene}(x)$ curve for each type of partisan court control.

deviation 0.4. Figure S2.3 shows 200 draws from the induced prior on court_outcome for each type of court control.




Figure S2.3: 200 draws from the prior on the $\text{court_outcome}(x)$ curve for each type of partisan court control.

Notice that, in expectation, $\text{court_outcome}(x)$ is increasing in x . This reflects our experience in following partisan gerrymandering litigation in state courts. For example, the Ohio state legislative plan was challenged multiple times in court, the outcome of each case inched towards a neutral map (according to simulations), rather than immediately jumping to a neutral map. In this case (as in many), this is because the legislature was given a new opportunity to draw a compliant plan; in practice, map-drawers tend to revise the existing plan as little as possible to stave off further litigation without abandoning the underlying partisan goals.

5. The probability and expected effect of a challenge based on the federal Voting Rights Act, which depends on whether a state was subject to DOJ preclearance pre-*Shelby*, as well as the partisan bias of the first enacted plan. The probability of a VRA challenge is zero for non-preclearance states; for preclearance

states it is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{pr_vra_chal}(x) &= F(a + bx) \\ a &= F^{-1}(\text{vra_chal_prob_bias}_0) \\ b &= (F^{-1}(\text{vra_chal_prob_bias}_2) - F^{-1}(\text{chal_prob_bias}_0))/2. \end{aligned}$$

The general form of $F(a + bx)$ means the challenge probability is asymmetrical: challenges are more likely for plans that favor Republicans. This follows from the high levels of racially polarized voting in the U.S. and specifically the strong preference for Democratic candidates by minority groups. The $\text{vra_chal_prob_bias}_0$ parameter is the probability of a VRA challenge against a plan with no partisan bias; its prior is $\text{Beta}(2, 18)$. Similarly, $\text{vra_chal_prob_bias}_2$, the challenge probability for a Republican-favoring plan, has a $\text{Beta}(9, 1)$ prior. The left panel of Figure S2.4 shows 200 draws from the induced prior on pr_vra_chal .




Figure S2.4: 200 draws from the prior on the $\text{pr_vra_chal}(x)$ curve (left) and the $\text{court_vra_outcome}(x)$ curve (right).

We assume the probability of a successful VRA claim does not depend on the partisan bias of the first enacted plan; this parameter is vra_interv_prob and receives a prior of $\text{Beta}(4, 1.5)$. The court-ordered remedy for a successful VRA challenge is specified as

$$\text{court_vra_outcome}(x) = \text{vra_out_slope}(x - \text{vra_out_breakeven}) + \text{vra_out_breakeven};$$

the intercept vra_out_breakeven has a $\mathcal{N}(-1.5, 0.5)$ prior and the slope vra_out_slope has a $\text{Beta}(16, 4)$ prior. So in expectation, VRA remedies make Republican-favoring plans slightly more Democratic. The right panel of Figure S2.4 shows 200 draws from the induced prior on court_vra_outcome .

Putting these five pieces together, we can write the expected outcome of the post-enactment processes as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{exp_court}(x) &= \text{pr_int_net}(x) \cdot \text{court_outcome}(x) \\ &\quad + (1 - \text{pr_int_net}(x)) \cdot \text{pr_vra_net}(x) \cdot \text{court_vra_outcome}(x) \\ &\quad + (1 - \text{pr_int_net}(x)) \cdot (1 - \text{pr_vra_net}(x)) \cdot x \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{pr_int_net}(x) &= \text{pr_chal_poss} \cdot \text{pr_chal_if_poss}(x) \cdot \text{pr_intervene}(x) \\ \text{pr_vra_net}(x) &= \text{pr_vra_chal}(x) \cdot \text{vra_interv_prob} \end{aligned}$$

Figure S2.5 shows 50 draws from the induced prior on $\text{exp_court}(x)$ for each combination of court control, court review, and DOJ preclearance. We can see that the most important factor in shaping post-enactment outcomes is the presence of court review, as might be expected. When court review is uncertain or not present, court processes are expected to only moderately constrain outcomes.




Figure S2.5: 50 draws from the prior on $\text{exp_court}(x)$ for each combination of relevant procedural variables.

S2.2 Stalemate process

When there is no stalemate process specified, when stalemate processes are exhausted, or when the stalemate process is controlled by neither party, the stalemate outcome is assumed to be a linear rescaling of the bias of the plan drawn at the previous stage, x , which acts as a sort of anchoring point, and the partisan control of the initial map drawer. The specification is

$$\text{stalemate_default}(x) = \begin{cases} \text{stale_slope} \cdot x - \text{out_nonp_part_adv} & \text{if the initial drawer is Democratic} \\ \text{stale_slope} \cdot x + \text{out_nonp_part_adv} & \text{if the initial drawer is Republican} \\ \text{stale_slope} \cdot x & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},$$

with out_nonp_part_adv defined as above, and stale_slope receiving a $\text{Beta}(3, 17)$ prior. This reflects a status quo bias towards the last-drawn plan.

When stalemates are specified as being resolved by state courts, and the state court is partisan, the stalemate outcome is

$$\begin{cases} \text{stale_slope} \cdot x - \text{out_nonp_part_adv} & \text{if Court Control is coded as "Democrats"} \\ \text{stale_slope} \cdot x + \text{out_nonp_part_adv} & \text{if Court Control is coded as "Republicans"} \end{cases}$$

given an input partisan bias x .

S2.3 Nonpartisan veto points

When veto control is coded as NA (other than in the case of a governor with overridable veto) or a court has a veto, the veto is exercised with probability

$$\text{pr_veto_chal}(x) = \text{veto_nonp_prob_max} \cdot \text{pr_chal_if_poss}(x),$$

with the parameter `veto_nonp_prob_max` receiving a $\text{Beta}(3, 7)$ prior. So these veto players are unlikely to intervene, but relatively more likely if the proposed plan is more extreme

Split-control veto players are assumed to never exercise their veto, as are governors that can be overridden (i.e., governors facing a veto-proof majority in both chambers; see the coding of this variable in Appendix S1).

S2.4 Split-control and nonpartisan map drawers

Map drawers with split partisan control are assumed to stalemate with probability controlled by parameter `stale_split_prob`, which has a $\text{Beta}(3, 5)$ prior. When they don't stalemate, split-control map drawers are assumed to propose a map with the same partisan bias as one drawn by a nonpartisan map drawer. While we suspect this probability could be set to 1 without changing the results, a probability of compromise reflects a history of compromise plans in state legislatures.

In Round 1, nonpartisan map drawers are assumed to propose a plan with partisan bias of 0. In Round 2—after one veto has already occurred—nonpartisan map drawers are assumed to shift the bias of their proposed plan in the direction of the average partisanship of the veto players. Specifically, if x is the proposal from the previous stage, then the proposal in Round 2 is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{exp_drawer_r2_nonp}(x) &= x + \text{veto_party} \cdot \text{veto_nonp_shift} \\ \text{veto_party} &= \begin{cases} -1 & \text{if both veto players are Democratic} \\ 1 & \text{if both veto players are Republican} \\ -\frac{1}{2} & \text{if one veto player is Democratic and the other is nonpartisan or absent} \\ \frac{1}{2} & \text{if one veto player is Republican and the other is nonpartisan or absent} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

The `veto_nonp_shift` parameter controls the amount of the shift and receives a $\mathcal{N}(0.65, 0.3)$ prior. This mechanism reflects real-world patterns of repeated map-drawing, such as when the (Republican-controlled) Iowa legislature rejected the proposed plan from the nonpartisan advisory commission, then adopted a second proposal from the same commission that favored Republicans. more.

S2.5 Walk-through of equilibrium calculation for Alabama

In Alabama, the legislature draws congressional districts, subject to a governor's veto, and there is no mechanism for state court review. Thus, Alabama's process would be described by the "Drawer" and "Veto 1" steps only in Round 1 of the Figure 3 process in the main text.

The first move belongs to the Republican party, which controls the state legislature. It has to pick the amount of partisan bias $-4 < x < 4$ in the plan that it adopts. If this plan is ultimately the final enacted plan, the Republicans receive utility x and the Democrats receive utility $-x$. The second move also belongs to the Republican party, which controls the governorship. The party must decide whether or not to veto the adopted plan; if it does, there is a second round of drawing and vetoing by the legislature and governor (controlled by Republicans).

If a plan is adopted at either the first or second round, it proceeds to possible court review. The court may decide to accept a legal challenge, decide in favor of the plaintiffs, and redraw the map; this choice is considered a

move by nature. If the court review results in a redrawn map with partisan bias x' , then the Republicans receive utility x' and the Democrats receive utility $-x'$. In Alabama, court review is generally not allowed on partisan grounds, but challenges under the federal Voting Rights Act are possible, so there is moderate probability of the legislature-adopted plan being overturned. If the legislature's plan is vetoed both times, the process results in a stalemate. Since there is no enumerated stalemate procedure in Alabama, courts must step in and redraw district lines to ensure compliance with federal constitutional "one person, one vote" apportionment requirements. This is also considered a move by nature.

To calculate the equilibrium itself, we numerically solve the game via backwards induction. This requires up to four levels of nested optimization. For Alabama, this means that we start with the last partisan move in the game, which is the Round 2, Veto 1 player, the Republican governor. She must decide, given a proposed partisan bias x from the Round 2 map drawer, whether to veto the plan, in which case the enacted plan is determined via the court stalemate process, or to accept the plan and let it become law. In either case, the resulting plan may be challenged in court.

The expected outcome of both the stalemate-then-court and court-alone choices are determined by the parameters governing the moves by nature. They are shown as a function of the bias of the legislature's proposed plan in Figure S2.6(a), for a typical set of game parameters. In this case, because the only realistic avenue for court review in Alabama is a VRA claim, the expected outcome of a court challenge given an enacted plan x is roughly x . The expected bias of a plan drawn through stalemate procedures under a Republican court is roughly 0.5, though it also increases monotonically in x . Since the governor wishes to maximize the signed partisan bias, she will veto the plan if its bias is less than about 0.5, and not veto it otherwise.

Having solved the Round 2, Veto 1 subgame, we move backwards to the Round 2 drawing subgame. The Republican legislature must decide on the partisan bias of the plan it proposes, or can choose to stalemate by




Figure S2.6: Expected outcomes for “veto” and “no veto” moves by Alabama’s Republican governor in Round 2 (left) and Round 1 (right), as a function of the partisan bias of the legislature’s proposed plan. The equilibrium outcome at each node is indicated by the dotted line. The range of biases correspond to the scale introduced in the theoretical modeling section in the main text.

failing to adopt a plan. If it stalemates, then the expected outcome will be given by the green “Veto” line in Figure S2.6(a), and will depend on the partisan bias of the plan originally adopted by the legislature in Round 1 before being vetoed. If it does not stalemate, then the expected outcome is determined by the dashed equilibrium line in Figure S2.6(a). To maximize the partisan bias, the legislature at Round 2 will draw a map with bias of +4, leading to expected bias (utility) of 2.84 for this set of game parameters.

We can then move backwards again and consider the Round 1, Veto 1 subgame. Figure S2.6(b) shows the expected outcomes under each choice, just as before. In equilibrium, the governor will veto any plan with bias less than 4; regardless of the governor’s decision, the expected bias is 2.84. Finally, the legislature can make any initial proposal, since the expected outcome is the same regardless. Thus, the overall equilibrium is a bias of 2.84. This solution process is automated across all of the states and is carried out on each of the 100 different draws from the prior on the game’s parameters.

S3 Redistricting Simulation Details

This section provides additional details on the redistricting simulations used in the analyses here.

S3.1 Generating the simulations

The 2020 simulations were taken from [McCartan et al. \(2022\)](#). As that paper documents, these simulations were generated through a consistent workflow based on shared template code. Each set of sampled plans underwent manual review by two human analysts, which included checks for statistical quality based on convergence diagnostic, as well as empirical checks on aspects of the generated plans, such as demographics, county splits, compactness, etc. These are explained at greater length below.

The 2010 simulations were generated in the exact same fashion, by making modifications where appropriate to the 2020 code, and using different district apportionments and Census data. All of the code for generating the simulations for both 2010 and 2020 is available at <https://github.com/alarm-redist/fifty-states>. That repository also includes documentation of the specific constraints and choices made in sampling plans for each state.

S3.1.1 Statistical quality control checks

Diagnostics for any iterative sampling method—MCMC, SMC, or others—cannot in general prove that a particular sample obtained through such a method is representative. However, diagnostics are designed to flag problems in sampling with high probability. Checking a battery of diagnostic methods is best practice when using any complex sampling algorithm. Some of the main diagnostics we check are described below.

- Distribution of the final SMC weights. Highly variable or heavy-tailed weights may indicate difficulty approximating the target distribution and high variance for downstream estimates.
- Plan diversity as measured by the variation of information metric. Identifies cases where many of the sampled plans are identical or nearly identical, which leads to discreteness artifacts and may indicate high variance and a possible lack of representativeness.
- Gelman-Rubin $\hat{R}$ statistics for each calculated summary statistic (demographics, vote totals, compactness, county splits, etc.) These check that fully independent runs of the algorithm produce samples from the same distribution. High $\hat{R}$ values indicate that the algorithm has not converged and that the samples are not representative of their target distribution.

S3.1.2 Substantive quality control checks

The values of the statistics below were also compared to those for the enacted plan. Significant discrepancies, as judged by the reviewers, could indicate a mismatch between the simulated plans and the criteria under which the enacted plan was drawn. These quality checks include statistics like:

- Population deviation from the ideal population. Most states had a limit of 0.5% deviation; some, like Iowa, had a lower threshold.
- Geographic compactness, as measured by the Polsby–Popper score or a graph-theoretic measure counting the number of removed edges. Some states used alternative measures of compactness as specified by law.
- County and municipality splits.
- Approximate Voting Rights Act (VRA) compliance. The number of districts with minority voting-age population fractions in certain ranges (e.g., majority-minority districts) and certain partisan ranges. If simulated maps produced fewer majority-minority districts with the same partisan characteristics as the enacted plan, then it is likely they would not have satisfied the VRA. We deferred judgement as to the required number and type of majority-minority districts to the enacting bodies.

S3.2 Simulation algorithm properties and validation

The simulations used in this paper were generated using a sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) algorithm described in [McCartan and Imai \(2023\)](#). Proposition 4.2 of that work establishes that, for a summary statistic h on plans, such as the average number of seats won by Democrats, the average value of h across a sample from the SMC algorithm will converge to the true mean in the target population of redistricting plans, with quantifiable error bounds provided by the CLT. It is exactly these summary statistic means that we subtract from various outcome measures in this work in order to control for geography.

On the request of a reviewer, we also conduct a validation analysis of the algorithm using a 25-precinct subset of the state of Florida, a dataset which is included in the `redist` software package implementing the algorithm. Additional and more comprehensive validation results are available in [McCartan and Imai \(2023\)](#).

This subset is small enough that all possible contiguous districting plans with three districts and a population deviation under 10% can be enumerated exactly. We compare this ground-truth enumeration, reweighted to the target probability distribution in [McCartan and Imai \(2023\)](#), with a sample of 16,000 maps (drawn in 8 independent runs of 2,000 maps) drawn using the SMC redistricting algorithm. For illustration, we calculate two summary statistics: a plan-wide compactness measure, and the 2008 two-party Democratic vote share by district. We compare the SMC estimate with the ground-truth value of each test statistic under the target distribution, which we calculate from the enumerated plans.

Figure S3.7 shows the results. The left panel shows the results for compactness, which indicate no statistically detectable difference between the sample (black points) and the ground truth (histogram bars). The right panel shows the results for the order statistics of Democratic vote share (e.g., Dem. share in the most-Democratic district is the rightmost estimate). Rather than showing the histogram and estimate together, this plot shows the difference between the estimate and the ground truth. This is because the standard errors are so small (on the order of 0.1pp) that they would not be otherwise visible. Once again, the agreement is excellent.




Figure S3.7: Results of validation study comparing SMC samples to ground-truth enumeration in a 25-precinct subset of Florida. Left: compactness distribution. Right: Democratic vote share order statistics.

S3.3 Limitations of simulation algorithms

Redistricting simulation algorithms generate samples from a particular target probability distribution. There are two main limitations of simulation approaches that stem from this fact.

First, sampling from complex, constrained spaces is a difficult statistical problem and can be done only approximately. Moreover, even if the sampling were perfect (i.e., we could generate i.i.d. samples from the target), the use of a finite set of samples to approximate the target distribution also leads to Monte Carlo errors. The potential risk of unacceptably high approximation error motivates the statistical quality control checks described above.

The second limitation is that the target distribution is designed to be both computationally feasible to sample from and to approximate the distribution of legal plans that would be drawn by a map drawer without any partisan information or bias. The default distribution that our samples are drawn from is described formally in [McCartan and Imai \(2023\)](#). It is uniform on the space of all contiguous districting plans with a certain population constraint, *after reweighting* according to a certain graph-theoretic measure of compactness. This target distribution can be further modified, within limits, based on other features of the simulation problem. A different choice of target distribution, which interprets the legal constraints differently, or which makes a different tradeoff with computational feasibility, would lead to different samples.

Thus, there is an inherent sensitivity of the results of any simulation analysis to the choice of target distribution. This is in many ways a key advantage of simulation algorithms—the target distribution can be tuned to ask different questions about districting plans in a state. But for an analysis such as ours, it also raises questions about the sensitivity of downstream analyses to these choices.

S3.4 Sensitivity of samples and downstream analyses to simulation choices

As mentioned above, the default distribution targeted by the simulation algorithm used here is modified by the inclusion of other constraints. While some of these additional constraints can be easily described mathematically and are documented alongside the simulation code, others have effects on the target that are more difficult to express in closed form.

The first is the incorporation of county and municipality boundaries, a constraint that is applied in the vast majority of states. This changes both the support of the target (it limits the number of splits of counties or municipalities) as well as the graph-theoretic compactness measure that appears as a weighting term in the target distribution. Moreover, in many states, we used a hybrid approach where counties were protected in most of the state, but inside metropolitan areas (where many districts might appear in the same county), we used municipality boundaries instead. This allowed us to trade off county and municipality splits to better approximate the balance seen in the enacted plans. A different treatment of these administrative boundaries would lead to a different target distribution.

The second is a multi-step simulation approach used in several large states with many districts, such as Texas, Florida, and California. In these states, the simulation algorithm was first run inside a designated set of counties, such as those comprising a major metropolitan area. Rarely would the population of this area exactly divide the ideal district population, so some population in these areas was left unassigned. This first-stage simulation was repeated possibly in other areas of the state as well. Then the algorithm was run a final time to assign the remaining population to districts.

Such a multi-stage approach is supported by the design of sequential Monte Carlo algorithms, but it does introduce an implicit constraint on the target distribution, altering it from the default described in [McCartan and Imai \(2023\)](#). Specifically, this simulation approach allowed for at most one district to span the border of the first-stage metropolitan areas. That is, there would be at most one district that took in the unassigned population from the first stage and connected it to population outside the first-stage area. Since the first-stage areas were defined by county borders, which are already protected by the algorithm in a similar way (i.e., only one district can span a given county border), in some states the effect of this setup may have been absent or minimal. In other states, this implicit constraint may have led to larger changes in the target distribution.

These changes and other decisions were made in an attempt to produce a sample representative of legal plans that would be drawn by a map drawer without any partisan information or bias. How might they affect the analyses conducted in this paper? A key point is that only the mean and standard deviation of the simulated distribution (rather than the entire distribution) were used to define the outcome variables in the analyses here (except the partisan harm outcomes used in the appendices only). In our experience, and as supported by the supplementary analysis conducted in Appendix J of [Kenny et al. \(2023\)](#), the first two moments are less sensitive to alternative simulation choices than other summary statistics, such as p-values from the tails of the distribution.

Even more importantly, the moments of the simulation distributions were not themselves the estimand of interest here. Rather, they were used to define an outcome variable, which was then time-differenced and fed into a regression model. So any biases or sensitivity in the simulation distribution that were constant over time would not affect the results. Moreover, any such sensitivity that is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, after differencing, would likewise have no effect. If sensitivity to simulation setup is considered as a form of measurement error, then the fact that simulations are used only in the regression outcome means that there is little risk of attenuation bias as there might be for predictor variables that use simulations.

S4 Additional Outcomes

For completeness, we consider a series of alternative outcomes which measure the partisan bias of redistricting plans to supplement our results presented in the main text. Many measures of partisan fairness have been developed, each of which has their own individual strengths and limitations. Our goal is to estimate the impact of redistricting reform on various aspects of partisan fairness (among other outcomes), and not to adjudicate the debate on the relative merits of existing fairness measures. To account for measurement concerns, here we evaluate a suite of common metrics and describe their various strengths and weaknesses. In addition to the seats-based measures reported in the main text, here we discuss and report results from the efficiency




Figure S4.8: Average causal response (ACR) of leeway on a set of additional redistricting outcomes not considered in the main text. The points correspond to the mean estimated ACR, while the lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Green corresponds to the party-blind (worst case) treatment, while purple corresponds to the party-signed treatment. The numbers in the columns display the mean ACR on each outcome's response scale. The points and lines are displayed in standard deviation units to allow for comparability between outcomes. For partisan outcomes, a positive number indicates a pro-Republican effect and a negative number indicates a pro-Democratic effect for a positive dose.

gap (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015), dilution asymmetry (Gordon and Yntiso, 2024), measures based on seats-votes curves (Katz et al., 2020), and differential harm (McCartan and Kenny, 2022).

We start with the efficiency gap, calculated as the difference between the wasted votes of the two parties (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015). Wasted votes are votes cast for losing candidates and votes cast for winning candidates beyond the threshold needed to win. The idea behind the efficiency gap is that a fair plan should have similar numbers of wasted votes for both parties. The partisan-signed version of the efficiency gap indicates which party benefits from the plan in terms of vote efficiency; we use positive values to indicate pro-Republican bias. Unlike with Republican seat share, we do not subtract the average simulated value from the partisan-signed efficiency gap measure. This is because the efficiency gap is already designed to have a universal scale, where 0 indicates partisan fairness; subtracting the simulated average would change the definition of a fair baseline for this measure. To create a nonpartisan measure, as with Republican seats, we take the absolute value of the difference between the enacted and average simulated plan's efficiency gap. Smaller values indicate a fairer plan by this measure (closer to the normatively preferred value of 0).

We supplement these results by considering a series of alternative measures, including the dilution asymmetry (Gordon and Yntiso, 2024). This measures the difference in the percentage of each party's votes that are wasted (cf. the number of wasted votes used in the calculation of the efficiency gap). Similar to the efficiency gap, we consider both the absolute value of differences from simulations and signed raw values for the dilution asymmetry.

A series of partisan bias measures are based on the seats-votes curve. Under a fair plan, the seats-votes curve should be symmetric (Katz et al., 2020). We consider two groups of measures based on the seats-votes curve. We consider the "partisan bias" which measures the deviation from symmetry in the seats-votes curve. We use both

the raw signed value and absolute value of the difference from simulations of the partisan bias. However, others have criticized measures based on partisan symmetry in terms of the realism of the implied fairness standard and its poor performance in competitive environments (DeFord et al., 2023).

Finally, we consider total and differential individual harm, which measures how a redistricting plan negatively affects the ability for a Democratic or Republican voter to elect a candidate of their choice, relative to simulated redistricting plans (McCartan and Kenny, 2022). Differential partisan harm is a signed measure where positive scores indicate Democrats are harmed at a higher rate than Republican voters. The total partisan harm of a plan is a nonpartisan measure, which represents the total harm to both parties.

We reiterate that all existing measures of partisan bias have specific strengths and weaknesses. As a result, we triangulate results across many common measures for our main analyses. For more in depth discussions of specific measures, see Stephanopoulos and McGhee (2018); Cho (2017); Bernstein and Walch (2022) on the efficiency gap, and DeFord et al. (2023); Katz et al. (2020) for an extended discussion of partisan symmetry-based measures.

S5 Estimation model details

The setup of the linear model used for the primary effect estimates is described in the estimation section in the main text. In terms of the prior specification, the intercept receives a weakly informative prior of $\mathcal{N}(0, (2.5 \cdot \sigma_y)^2)$, where σ_y^2 is the variance of ΔY_i . Each main effect coefficient receives a weakly informative prior of $\mathcal{N}(0, (0.75 \cdot \sigma_y / \sigma_x)^2)$, where σ_x^2 is the variance of each covariate x . The prior standard deviation is further scaled by 0.25 for interaction terms, following the discussion in Gelman et al. (2008). Finally, the residual standard deviation receives an $\text{Expo}(1/\sigma_y)$ prior. Computation is carried out via NUTS-HMC as implemented in the Stan probabilistic programming language (Stan Development Team, 2024).

S6 Robustness Checks

S6.1 Nonparametric outcome model

This appendix shows analogous results to Figure 7 in the main text and Figure S4.8 but using a Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART) model (Chipman et al., 2010), rather than a linear model, for outcome modeling. The results are qualitatively the same but the estimated effect magnitudes are attenuated. There is no equivalent of a coefficient estimate with BART as with linear models, so coefficient estimates are not presented here.

S6.2 Including treatment components as controls

To evaluate robustness to violations of the sufficiency assumption, i.e., that

$$Y_{it}(\mathbf{z}) = Y_{it}(\mathbf{z}') \quad \text{for any } \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{z}' \text{ with } u^*(\mathbf{z}) = u^*(\mathbf{z}'),$$

we re-run the ACR estimates including $\mathbf{z}$ as a covariate. If the assumption were to hold, $\mathbf{z}$ should have no effect on the outcome, since u is controlled for. Of course, the data are limited ($n = 43$), and the dimension of $\mathbf{z}$ is relatively large—the six elements we use here must be included as levels and as differences, and are each interacted with the change in u . Thus we would likely expect some changes due solely to random noise.

Some of the elements of $\mathbf{z}$ do not change from 2010-2020 or exhibit variation in only one or two states. We remove these elements, and re-code several “control” variables as Democratic/Republican/Other to further avoid exact collinearity. The final specification for additional covariates included in ACR estimation is as follows:

- drawer in 2010




Figure S6.9: Version of Figure 7 using a BART outcome model.

- Indicator for drawer_ctrl being democrats in 2010
- Indicator for drawer_ctrl being republicans in 2010
- Indicator for veto_1 being governor in 2010
- Indicator for veto_1_ctrl being democrats in 2010
- Indicator for veto_1_ctrl being republicans in 2010
- court_review in 2010
- Indicator for court_ctrl being democrats in 2010
- Indicator for court_ctrl being republicans in 2010
- Indicator for any change in drawer from 2010 to 2020
- Indicator for any change in drawer_ctrl from 2010 to 2020
- Indicator for any change in veto_1 from 2010 to 2020
- Indicator for any change in veto_1_ctrl from 2010 to 2020
- Indicator for any change in court_ctrl from 2010 to 2020

Figure S6.11 displays the results of this robustness check. ACRs estimated with the additional controls are plotted against the original estimates along with 90% credible intervals. While there are some differences, there are no sign errors—estimates whose credible intervals exclude 0 in one direction originally and in another direction under the robustness check. In fact, none of the estimated ACRs is statistically distinguishable across specifications. The credible intervals for the alternative specification are wider, as would be expected for adding a large number of additional controls. Altogether these results give us confidence that, in addition to substantive reasons for believing the sufficiency assumption holds, violations of the assumption may not lead to statistically different conclusions.




Figure S6.10: Version of Figure S4.8 using a BART outcome model.

S7 Descriptive analysis of changes

For completeness, we conduct a descriptive analysis that examines how the raw dosages in our leeway variables correlate with the raw changes in the outcomes used in our main analysis. Figure S7.12 to Figure S7.17 plot the change in the realized leeway (left plot) and maximum leeway (right plot) against the change in a different outcome variable. The solid line indicates the linear model fit while the shaded area represents the 95% pointwise confidence interval. Many states had no changes in their redistricting processes, and thus no change in leeway, which is indicated by the stacking of states at 0 for both leeway measures. While this analysis does not adjust for observed confounding variables as we do in the main text, the linear trends observed in these figures are qualitatively consistent with our main results based on ACRs in Figure 7 in the main text.

S8 Robustness to reduced court intervention

This paper focuses on the plans used in the first election after redistricting, whereas litigation can change the enacted plan well after this point. As such, plans which are labelled as having been drawn by legislatures and, less frequently, commissions, may eventually be redrawn by courts. Peeking at such eventualities in designing our game theoretic model can introduce post-treatment bias, so we avoid this. Notably, states in the South are susceptible to VRA litigation that can take more than the 14 months between Census data release and November general elections. They may see more restriction in the model than is empirically true in that time period.

Below, we demonstrate that tuning parameters for solving the game do not meaningfully impact the calculated Nash equilibria. To produce this, we lower the model parameters across the board. We largely decrease the likelihood of VRA litigation changing the final plan and modestly decrease the probability that other litigation changes the final plan.

As Figure S8.18 demonstrates, greatly reducing the probability of court intervention does not meaningfully impact the Nash equilibria. While values do shift by small amounts, these are very small (on the order of 0.1) compared to the total range of 0–4 or –4–4.




Figure S6.11: Comparison of estimated ACRs with (y-axis) and without (x-axis) treatment components as controls. Point estimates and 90% credible intervals are shown for both specifications. ACRs are faceted by type of outcome and the treatment specification used.

S9 State-level estimates of counterfactual policy analysis

Figure S9.19 present the state-specific estimates of the counterfactual policy analysis whereas Figure 9 in the main text shows the national-level estimate that aggregates these state-level estimates. Each bar represents the point estimate for the increase in the number of Republican seats. Like the aggregate estimates, state-specific estimates should also be interpreted with caution, as there may be unmodelled heterogeneity.




Figure S7.12: Changes in realized leeway (left) and maximum leeway (right) against the change in the magnitude of the Republican seats difference from simulations.




Figure S7.13: Changes in realized leeway (left) and maximum leeway (right) against the change in the magnitude of the z-score of the Republican seats difference from simulations.




Figure S7.14: Changes in realized leeway (left) and maximum leeway (right) against the change in the magnitude of the efficiency gap difference from simulations.




Figure S7.15: Changes in realized leeway (left) and maximum leeway (right) against the change in the magnitude of the responsiveness difference from simulations.




Figure S7.16: Changes in realized leeway (left) and maximum leeway (right) against the change in the the Republican seats difference from simulations.




Figure S7.17: Changes in realized leeway (left) and maximum leeway (right) against the change in the z-score of the Republican seats difference from simulations.




Figure S8.18: Changes in Nash equilibria after decreasing the probability of court intervention




Figure S9.19: State-level Estimates of Counterfactual Policy Analysis The figures show the predicted number of seats that would change under three redistricting institution reforms: (1) a New York-style commission with a nonpartisan map drawer and several partisan veto points; (2) an Ohio-style legislature-drawn map and several partisan and bipartisan veto points; and (3) a Michigan-style reform, with a nonpartisan commission, no partisan veto points, and the potential for court review.

S10 Coefficient estimates for all models

Table S10.2 below contains point estimates and standard errors for all estimated model coefficients. Each set of rows marked by a single value in the “Model” column represents a separately estimated model. “D.2” in the “Spec.” (specification) column indicates the robustness check specification used in the corresponding appendix.

Table S10.2: All model coefficients.

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst	0.0922100	0.1698000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	nash_worst_10	0.1204000	0.0376100
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0592000	0.3000000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	is_south	0.1920000	0.1424000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0199200	0.1390000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.5797000	0.1312000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.1515000	0.1038000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	initiative	0.1491000	0.1074000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.3290000	0.1402000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.1811000	0.1070000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	-0.0030640	0.0221500
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	-0.0081760	0.1509000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.0001740	0.1079000
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0040420	0.0338400
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0289600	0.0876100
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0067070	0.0243700
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	0.0411100	0.0892700
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0183800	0.0779900
1a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0523900	0.0855700
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst	0.1158000	0.2405000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	nash_worst_10	0.1776000	0.0921600
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0782500	0.8347000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	is_south	0.2691000	0.1746000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0131100	0.1966000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.6165000	0.1740000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0892500	0.1221000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	initiative	0.1181000	0.1521000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	0.0266100	0.4229000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	-0.1293000	0.5066000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0299600	0.2661000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0749100	0.2389000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0600500	0.3332000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.2916000	0.1832000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.1234000	0.2085000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	-0.1335000	0.1964000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	-0.0410900	0.2411000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0257600	0.2033000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0682300	0.1943000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	0.6692000	0.6118000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.6106000	0.2282000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	-0.1786000	0.5508000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0078810	0.1949000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.1639000	0.1520000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	-0.0018940	0.0230500
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	0.0066810	0.1486000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	-0.0101900	0.1299000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0058600	0.0328600
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0131700	0.0971600
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0058930	0.0246000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	0.0161200	0.1042000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_10legislature	0.0091790	0.0878900
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1122000	0.2419000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0033270	0.0917100
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0125600	0.0887400
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0722100	0.1727000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0048600	0.0893200
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10no	-0.0137800	0.0960000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10yes	0.1077000	0.2592000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0034900	0.1956000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0084940	0.1005000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_chg	-0.0016970	0.0870600
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0342000	0.0863800
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_chg	0.0376300	0.1146000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0203700	0.1128000
1a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0357400	0.1038000
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party	-0.0295300	0.0741200

(continued)

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	nash_party_10	0.0088360	0.0351200
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dvs_08	0.3151000	0.3562000
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	is_south	0.2423000	0.1660000
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0453700	0.1816000
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.5263000	0.1692000
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0980100	0.1163000
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.0021010	0.1221000
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0147700	0.0097720
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	0.0007740	0.0776700
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:is_south	-0.0090230	0.0415400
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0183900	0.0227800
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0083190	0.0419100
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0077590	0.0142600
1b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:initiative	0.0235600	0.0476500
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party	-0.0184900	0.1058000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	nash_party_10	0.0547400	0.0684200
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.5207000	0.8327000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	is_south	0.2436000	0.1861000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0357800	0.1812000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.6422000	0.1696000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.1263000	0.1231000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.0282500	0.1669000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	0.3333000	0.4562000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	0.2839000	0.4546000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.5063000	0.3201000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.1192000	0.2879000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0485400	0.3125000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.2651000	0.2134000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.2341000	0.2123000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	0.0529300	0.1712000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	-0.1665000	0.2067000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0893200	0.2023000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0664300	0.2078000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	0.4241000	0.4824000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.4046000	0.2567000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	-0.3477000	0.4949000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.1627000	0.2095000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.1957000	0.1480000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0069170	0.0130900
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	-0.0069730	0.0811200
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:is_south	0.0153400	0.0450400
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0097240	0.0229000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0028650	0.0505700
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0049950	0.0144800
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:initiative	0.0345300	0.0515900
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_10legislature	0.0006761	0.0387300
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0111500	0.0466700
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0033420	0.0638700
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0009579	0.0405900
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0322200	0.0589200
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0626700	0.0643100
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10no	-0.0146600	0.0421900
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10yes	-0.0854400	0.2236000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0182900	0.0483800
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0430000	0.0791900
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_chg	0.0076870	0.0960200
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0092040	0.0406700
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_chg	0.0422800	0.1157000
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0111800	0.0501500
1b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0257800	0.0422600
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty	0.0235200	0.1036000
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	nash_absparty_10	0.1054000	0.0396400
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0629600	0.2967000
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	is_south	0.0892200	0.1533000
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0474100	0.1434000
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.4878000	0.1285000
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.1497000	0.1063000
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.0218300	0.1180000
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	0.0190700	0.0214800
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:dvs_08	0.0020800	0.1119000
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:is_south	0.0075720	0.0648900
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	0.0066610	0.0275600
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:distr_chg	0.0264900	0.0748300
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0081760	0.0191800
1c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:initiative	0.0572600	0.0629500
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty	0.1051000	0.1474000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	nash_absparty_10	0.1215000	0.0606000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.1022000	0.7756000

(continued)

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	is_south	0.1470000	0.1800000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0252000	0.1781000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.5575000	0.1482000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0868900	0.1220000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.0278000	0.1635000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	-0.0570400	0.4334000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	0.0462000	0.4458000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.1877000	0.3531000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.2867000	0.3080000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.2563000	0.3481000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.3611000	0.1839000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.2237000	0.1863000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	-0.0042490	0.1575000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	-0.0753600	0.2026000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.1144000	0.1924000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0297600	0.1762000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	0.6493000	0.4931000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.5558000	0.2172000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	-0.3408000	0.5054000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.2211000	0.1832000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.2552000	0.1412000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	0.0066090	0.0239900
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:dvs_08	0.0030920	0.1037000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:is_south	0.0703500	0.0794500
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	0.0081530	0.0271100
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:distr_chg	0.0130000	0.0868900
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0096030	0.0190000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:initiative	0.0546000	0.0698500
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_10legislature	0.0002092	0.0566400
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0114900	0.1275000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0151500	0.0692700
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0002428	0.0601200
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1119000	0.0932700
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0411000	0.0646600
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:court_review_10no	-0.0195500	0.0605800
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:court_review_10yes	0.2082000	0.2117000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0376700	0.0978500
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0248200	0.0735600
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_chg	-0.0375100	0.0970500
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0176100	0.0735600
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:veto_1_chg	0.0042110	0.1191000
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0242500	0.0691200
1c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0387800	0.0664700
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst	-0.1733000	0.9498000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	nash_worst_10	0.7424000	0.2433000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dvs_08	-0.5131000	1.9460000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	is_south	0.1175000	0.9377000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.2749000	0.9025000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	distr_chg	2.0860000	0.9052000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.5105000	0.6676000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	initiative	0.8742000	0.7178000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-1.7080000	0.9161000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-1.0510000	0.7081000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0025820	0.1293000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	-0.1390000	0.8404000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.4349000	0.6112000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0517200	0.1908000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0893900	0.5031000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0517900	0.1377000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	0.0121800	0.5320000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.3489000	0.4675000
2a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0869100	0.4954000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst	-0.0288700	1.3370000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	nash_worst_10	1.2230000	0.3077000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dvs_08	-1.3320000	4.6840000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	is_south	0.3205000	0.9910000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.1500000	1.0540000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	distr_chg	2.2570000	0.9186000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.3877000	0.7311000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	initiative	0.6200000	0.9112000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_10commission	0.8990000	2.4220000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_10legislature	-1.0660000	2.7930000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1126000	1.4990000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.8214000	1.4020000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.4177000	1.9670000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	1.7640000	1.0900000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.3611000	1.2290000

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Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_review_10no	-1.0150000	1.0790000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_review_10yes	-1.1640000	1.3150000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.5148000	1.1050000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-1.5900000	1.1260000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_chg	1.1540000	3.7700000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-2.4550000	1.2740000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	veto_1_chg	-0.1525000	3.4750000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.7144000	1.1050000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.7184000	0.8933000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	-0.0023180	0.1358000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	-0.0174700	0.8925000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.1729000	0.6867000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0169000	0.2001000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0191000	0.5254000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0188400	0.1421000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	-0.0580400	0.6195000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_10legislature	-0.0165400	0.4945000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-1.5730000	1.3850000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0971500	0.4618000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0574300	0.4660000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.1378000	0.9984000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0264700	0.5049000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10no	0.0676400	0.4943000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10yes	0.4417000	1.4390000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.5672000	1.1340000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0032180	0.5674000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_chg	0.1195000	0.5210000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.2246000	0.4794000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_chg	0.2309000	0.6461000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0762300	0.6616000
2a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	-0.1629000	0.5658000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party	-0.1106000	0.4389000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	nash_party_10	-0.0309900	0.2095000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dvs_08	1.8510000	2.1990000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	is_south	0.4828000	1.0690000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.5251000	1.0670000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	distr_chg	1.8570000	0.9982000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.2516000	0.6884000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	initiative	0.1156000	0.7670000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0764200	0.0580300
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	-0.0033500	0.4434000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:is_south	0.0161600	0.2441000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0779200	0.1332000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	-0.0276800	0.2575000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0380700	0.0818000
2b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:initiative	0.0465800	0.2643000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party	-0.0938300	0.5819000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	nash_party_10	0.3828000	0.1400000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dvs_08	-1.2660000	4.8790000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	is_south	0.4786000	1.1090000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0823200	1.0770000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	distr_chg	2.5800000	1.0230000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.4478000	0.7317000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	initiative	-0.1110000	1.0740000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_10commission	1.9810000	2.6560000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_10legislature	1.5570000	2.6690000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	2.9720000	2.0080000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.4800000	1.7590000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.2115000	1.8550000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	1.7050000	1.2910000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0746500	1.2230000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_review_10no	-0.7637000	1.0630000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_review_10yes	-2.8080000	1.2940000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.4976000	1.1820000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-1.1890000	1.1850000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_chg	1.9790000	2.9240000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-1.5270000	1.5000000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	veto_1_chg	-1.1060000	3.0410000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.9332000	1.2930000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.7018000	0.9063000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0368100	0.0714800
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	-0.0632800	0.4469000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:is_south	0.0885100	0.2550000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0398200	0.1356000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	-0.0179400	0.2775000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0246900	0.0855000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:initiative	0.0530200	0.2827000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:drawer_10legislature	0.0095870	0.2128000

(continued)

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0475400	0.2762000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.1161000	0.3727000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0141200	0.2264000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1879000	0.3483000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.3575000	0.3580000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10no	-0.0000227	0.2465000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10yes	-0.6290000	1.2700000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1556000	0.2770000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.1393000	0.4352000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:drawer_chg	0.1278000	0.5755000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0556800	0.2141000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_chg	0.4454000	0.7085000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.0067760	0.2945000
2b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:court_ctrl_chg	-0.1046000	0.2331000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty	0.3750000	0.5685000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	nash_absparty_10	0.6455000	0.2556000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dvs_08	-0.2841000	1.9250000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	is_south	-0.5820000	0.9196000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0509600	0.8567000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	distr_chg	1.8290000	0.8612000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.5068000	0.6404000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	initiative	-0.0409300	0.6857000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	0.0961400	0.1176000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:dvs_08	0.0340300	0.5796000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:is_south	0.0176200	0.3965000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	0.0450300	0.1501000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:distr_chg	-0.0699600	0.4190000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0424700	0.1118000
2c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:initiative	0.2494000	0.3432000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty	0.5915000	0.8508000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	nash_absparty_10	0.6252000	0.4221000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dvs_08	0.2560000	4.8550000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	is_south	-0.2975000	1.1510000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0792100	1.0920000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	distr_chg	2.2210000	0.9197000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.2369000	0.7346000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	initiative	-0.2535000	1.0570000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_10commission	0.4780000	2.6090000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_10legislature	0.7178000	2.6310000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.7762000	2.0750000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.4758000	1.7970000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-1.4440000	2.1400000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	1.8540000	1.1920000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0827700	1.1630000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_review_10no	-1.0090000	1.0010000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_review_10yes	-2.1330000	1.2950000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.7904000	1.1840000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.8877000	1.1510000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_chg	2.7690000	0.8000000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-2.1420000	1.3220000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	veto_1_chg	-0.8346000	3.0600000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	1.1060000	1.1590000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-1.1970000	0.8580000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	0.0407700	0.1399000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:dvs_08	0.0556000	0.6168000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:is_south	0.2656000	0.4589000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	0.0252700	0.1510000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:distr_chg	-0.0527700	0.5021000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0342700	0.1090000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:initiative	0.1372000	0.4096000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_10legislature	0.0230400	0.3257000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.1466000	0.7641000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0739900	0.4094000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0424100	0.3187000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.5804000	0.5307000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.2279000	0.3834000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:court_review_10no	-0.0599400	0.3303000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:court_review_10yes	1.0840000	1.2240000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0821800	0.5765000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0806700	0.4581000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_chg	-0.0545900	0.5409000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0959100	0.4152000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:veto_1_chg	0.2640000	0.7198000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.0482000	0.4024000
2c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_absparty:court_ctrl_chg	-0.2810000	0.3772000
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst	0.0034090	0.0154100
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	nash_worst_10	0.0109600	0.0035050

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Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0082100	0.0278100
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	is_south	0.0121900	0.0134100
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0180100	0.0121100
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0294700	0.0124900
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0247900	0.0090730
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0227500	0.0101400
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0138700	0.0122300
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0151700	0.0097770
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	-0.0003753	0.0018340
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	-0.0010740	0.0126000
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.0005834	0.0099230
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0005743	0.0028980
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0024730	0.0079800
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0005840	0.0021580
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	0.0042070	0.0081570
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0058840	0.0070800
3a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0063710	0.0078200
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst	0.0069260	0.0212300
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	nash_worst_10	0.0200400	0.0074050
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0501700	0.0731500
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	is_south	0.0188700	0.0145800
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0189300	0.0169900
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0398300	0.0146000
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0230300	0.0106700
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0176200	0.0125400
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	0.0374000	0.0372900
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	-0.0019590	0.0444300
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0062180	0.0228000
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0135800	0.0211200
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0046540	0.0270000
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0148400	0.0159900
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0101300	0.0177500
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	-0.0152300	0.0164500
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	-0.0120100	0.0200500
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0024020	0.0163500
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0134000	0.0166700
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	0.0574600	0.0551700
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0324900	0.0181800
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	0.0193400	0.0506800
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0031690	0.0171900
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0091530	0.0134100
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	-0.0000626	0.0020230
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	0.0014520	0.0131900
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.0005784	0.0109700
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0004588	0.0029920
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0010070	0.0080300
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0005516	0.0022830
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	0.0016460	0.0089770
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_10legislature	0.0000594	0.0076030
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0203100	0.0213600
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0003546	0.0074010
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0019840	0.0072720
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0108500	0.0143600
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0007455	0.0083570
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10no	0.0012230	0.0077880
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10yes	0.0187900	0.0224300
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0014880	0.0162200
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0010120	0.0083700
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_chg	0.0024570	0.0081450
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0055740	0.0075050
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_chg	0.0076900	0.0103300
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0040650	0.0099880
3a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0050050	0.0084690
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party	0.0004750	0.0068000
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	nash_party_10	0.0031080	0.0028840
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	0.0255400	0.0316500
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	is_south	0.0182700	0.0155400
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0097550	0.0151500
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0277900	0.0141700
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0195500	0.0103800
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0159200	0.0112900
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0008629	0.0008925
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	-0.0006802	0.0069350
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:is_south	0.0001596	0.0036490
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0010890	0.0020490
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0000555	0.0038550
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0004865	0.0012750
3b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:initiative	0.0001391	0.0039350

(continued)

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party	-0.0001088	0.0087190
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	nash_party_10	0.0102000	0.0065870
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0382900	0.0720200
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	is_south	0.0264100	0.0185300
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0172400	0.0163800
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0389000	0.0155000
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0214300	0.0114700
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0118900	0.0162600
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	0.0461500	0.0425100
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	0.0337400	0.0427400
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0556700	0.0307900
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0010410	0.0270400
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0088700	0.0310700
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0142800	0.0209100
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0182200	0.0194700
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	-0.0030840	0.0158200
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	-0.0339700	0.0187000
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0021720	0.0179200
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0112900	0.0188000
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	0.0353500	0.0441400
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0164800	0.0236900
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	-0.0019030	0.0447600
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.0126700	0.0178800
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0091070	0.0130900
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0005585	0.0010620
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	-0.0003332	0.0069140
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:is_south	0.0016410	0.0037880
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0005619	0.0019890
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	-0.0008523	0.0043270
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0004252	0.0012080
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:initiative	0.0006701	0.0043370
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_10legislature	-0.0002604	0.0032460
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0012570	0.0041600
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0030900	0.0058300
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0003101	0.0034420
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0027950	0.0053980
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0038320	0.0057750
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10no	0.0004444	0.0036440
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10yes	-0.0222000	0.0204100
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0017310	0.0043700
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0022740	0.0067150
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_chg	0.0028130	0.0087840
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0010320	0.0035960
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_chg	0.0056780	0.0110900
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0007396	0.0045560
3b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0015060	0.0035590
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty	0.0055800	0.0088540
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	nash_absparty_10	0.0111700	0.0036790
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0059240	0.0287100
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	is_south	0.0060660	0.0129700
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0171900	0.0129900
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0270500	0.0110900
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0232400	0.0094870
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0114200	0.0097960
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	0.0013310	0.0018560
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:dvs_08	0.0013190	0.0091290
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:is_south	-0.0018640	0.0056790
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	0.0006359	0.0023420
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:distr_chg	0.0001628	0.0062080
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0004881	0.0015790
3c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:initiative	0.0049590	0.0048640
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty	0.0120800	0.0131200
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	nash_absparty_10	0.0137700	0.0057200
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0532900	0.0687300
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	is_south	0.0087660	0.0153200
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0217300	0.0154500
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0278500	0.0129100
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0197100	0.0103700
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0024490	0.0135900
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	0.0444100	0.0408600
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	0.0263500	0.0407900
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0246400	0.0304100
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0211700	0.0268300
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0323000	0.0289300
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0130100	0.0155000
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0171700	0.0164900
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	-0.0065210	0.0138800

(continued)

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	-0.0207500	0.0170000
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0118300	0.0161800
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0030270	0.0159100
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	0.0664200	0.0420900
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0248400	0.0187400
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	-0.0104800	0.0435500
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.0172900	0.0160400
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0205100	0.0118500
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	0.0005437	0.0021350
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:dvs_08	0.0010430	0.0096180
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:is_south	0.0045200	0.0068250
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	0.0000261	0.0025340
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:distr_chg	-0.0002019	0.0073170
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:veto(1 + corrupt)	0.0002019	0.0016850
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:initiative	0.0043290	0.0060940
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_10legislature	0.0009583	0.0048580
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0058300	0.0113200
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0003822	0.0060510
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0007124	0.0051000
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0094100	0.0075790
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0034980	0.0056990
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:court_review_10no	0.0003399	0.0054640
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:court_review_10yes	0.0365000	0.0192900
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0012730	0.0084090
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0011660	0.0064410
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_chg	-0.0006126	0.0084260
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0026200	0.0060300
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:veto_1_chg	0.0045530	0.0100800
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0017500	0.0062190
3c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. efficiency gap, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0052610	0.0058710
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst	-0.5040000	0.3249000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	nash_worst_10	0.0511000	0.0783400
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0515300	0.6325000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	is_south	-0.2571000	0.2900000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.2764000	0.2839000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	-0.0207200	0.2708000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	0.2409000	0.2064000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	initiative	0.1213000	0.2333000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.3277000	0.2717000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.1042000	0.2261000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	-0.0098560	0.0381400
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	-0.0747200	0.2653000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.1436000	0.1916000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0185000	0.0586400
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.1821000	0.1680000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0002498	0.0415100
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	-0.1362000	0.1571000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.1319000	0.0444000
4a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	0.1868000	0.1722000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst	-0.1812000	0.4106000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	nash_worst_10	-0.0974100	0.1506000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	0.5352000	1.3980000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	is_south	-0.3733000	0.3041000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.3033000	0.3169000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	-0.1239000	0.2753000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	0.4055000	0.2115000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.1548000	0.2573000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	-0.5355000	0.7223000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	-0.0105000	0.8527000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.5502000	0.4356000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0510900	0.4229000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.3414000	0.5766000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.2142000	0.3090000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.5780000	0.3634000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	-0.1596000	0.3026000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	0.1841000	0.3921000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1019000	0.3286000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.2358000	0.3044000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	-0.2841000	1.0540000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0104200	0.3696000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	0.7007000	1.0180000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0077630	0.3278000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0667600	0.2712000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	-0.0014840	0.0405900
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	-0.0302000	0.2690000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.0983600	0.2119000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0043860	0.0060800
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0534900	0.1719000

(continued)

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0004914	0.0425000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	-0.1214000	0.1844000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_10legislature	-0.0149700	0.1482000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.9050000	0.4345000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0400100	0.1549000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0292100	0.1483000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.1041000	0.2791000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0568200	0.1582000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10no	0.0357800	0.1596000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10yes	0.5710000	0.4493000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1790000	0.3239000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0161500	0.1712000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_chg	0.0706900	0.1541000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0030820	0.1469000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_chg	0.0779000	0.2059000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0042470	0.1904000
4a+	D.2	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	0.0796200	0.1755000
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party	-0.0857300	0.1380000
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	nash_party_10	-0.0840100	0.0632200
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	0.0955400	0.6618000
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	is_south	-0.0489900	0.3292000
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.3575000	0.3227000
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	-0.1266000	0.2945000
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	0.3266000	0.2212000
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	initiative	0.1308000	0.2437000
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	-0.0018520	0.0164600
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	-0.0065000	0.1476000
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:is_south	0.0008636	0.0739200
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	-0.0078780	0.0397000
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0214400	0.0798200
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0062720	0.0249400
4b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:initiative	-0.0429300	0.0838400
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party	-0.0059870	0.1753000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	nash_party_10	-0.0510500	0.1260000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.1863000	1.5630000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	is_south	-0.3635000	0.3879000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.2515000	0.3418000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	-0.1537000	0.3415000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	0.3733000	0.2364000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.1713000	0.3391000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	-0.1430000	0.8342000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	-0.1140000	0.8652000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.7943000	0.6260000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.1827000	0.5567000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.4110000	0.6598000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0697500	0.4365000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.7651000	0.4102000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	-0.4108000	0.3467000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	-0.0116500	0.4301000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.2444000	0.4014000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.1231000	0.3880000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	0.2795000	0.9421000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	0.2804000	0.4788000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	-0.0008073	0.9210000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.5473000	0.3920000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.2584000	0.2946000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0053380	0.0198600
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	0.0141100	0.1392000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:is_south	-0.0055970	0.0786300
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	-0.0017890	0.0412000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0047680	0.0875800
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0009699	0.0278800
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:initiative	-0.0454000	0.0912100
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_10legislature	-0.0076840	0.0693300
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0269500	0.0824800
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0340900	0.1124000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0087070	0.0689800
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0649900	0.1061000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0180900	0.1088000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10no	0.0437300	0.0710100
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10yes	0.0368500	0.3919000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0294700	0.0824900
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0083100	0.1318000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_chg	0.0220600	0.1786000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0162700	0.0695100
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_chg	0.0571100	0.2168000
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0092160	0.0864700

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Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
4b+	D.2	Realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_ctrl_chg	0.0078290	0.0702100
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty	-0.0056000	0.1890000
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	nash_absparty_10	-0.0062160	0.0072600
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	0.1408000	0.7050000
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	is_south	-0.3119000	0.3395000
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.3217000	0.3009000
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	-0.0446300	0.2871000
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	0.2829000	0.2280000
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	initiative	0.1155000	0.2545000
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	-0.0038710	0.0403100
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:dvs_08	0.0265300	0.1806000
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:is_south	-0.0340600	0.1283000
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	-0.0068260	0.0446400
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:distr_chg	0.0033500	0.1403000
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0106200	0.0329300
4c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:initiative	0.0363300	0.1147000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty	-0.0275500	0.2573000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	nash_absparty_10	-0.1879000	0.1358000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	0.3947000	1.5340000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	is_south	-0.4641000	0.3935000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.3107000	0.3759000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	-0.1005000	0.3372000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	0.3809000	0.2615000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.1736000	0.3441000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	-0.1258000	0.8168000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	-0.0497300	0.8770000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	1.2340000	0.6887000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.3785000	0.6112000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.3014000	0.7364000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1275000	0.4094000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.8599000	0.4147000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	-0.3862000	0.3469000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	-0.1384000	0.4367000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.1244000	0.4116000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.1710000	0.4187000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	0.0852600	0.9350000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	0.1069000	0.4806000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	0.4760000	0.9691000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.2268000	0.4020000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.2667000	0.3054000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	0.0008925	0.0440300
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:dvs_08	-0.0092690	0.1810000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:is_south	0.0313900	0.1432000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	-0.0010450	0.0465000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:distr_chg	0.0137200	0.1588000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0004412	0.0338500
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:initiative	-0.0527100	0.1297000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_10legislature	0.0021400	0.0977000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0116700	0.2469000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0033200	0.1309000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0029750	0.0987400
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0084340	0.1574000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0002261	0.1214000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:court_review_10no	-0.0285600	0.1091000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:court_review_10yes	0.2185000	0.4062000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0853500	0.1758000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0191300	0.1392000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_chg	0.0645000	0.1657000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0171400	0.1208000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:veto_1_chg	0.0750600	0.2137000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.0304100	0.1344000
4c+	D.2	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Responsiveness, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0132500	0.1166000
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_worst	-0.0165500	0.0510400
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	nash_worst_10	-0.0025810	0.0132200
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0617000	0.1077000
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	is_south	-0.0546900	0.0517100
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0185100	0.0437100
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0032880	0.0465600
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	0.0226100	0.0328000
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.0321200	0.0382000
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0262500	0.0470900
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	0.0563000	0.0389000
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0008292	0.0062760
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	0.0038110	0.0377300
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	-0.0075570	0.0305600
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0002773	0.0082480
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	-0.0010920	0.0240500
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0000910	0.0065210

(continued)

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	-0.0054720	0.0258600
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0039110	0.0218800
5a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	0.0123900	0.0248400
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_party	0.0063040	0.0187400
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	nash_party_10	-0.0027250	0.0091350
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.00828700	0.00971700
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	is_south	-0.0091200	0.0489600
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0136300	0.0468200
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	-0.0149100	0.0430700
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	0.0125300	0.0323100
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.0296000	0.0343900
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	-0.0031530	0.0025380
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	0.0001475	0.0200300
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_party:is_south	0.0036470	0.0100400
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	-0.0023670	0.0056400
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0022740	0.0111600
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0003195	0.0036200
5b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_party:initiative	-0.0001860	0.0127100
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty	-0.0070150	0.0287500
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	nash_absparty_10	0.0008961	0.0127000
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.0287400	0.1003000
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	is_south	-0.0441000	0.0485400
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0201700	0.0436300
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0034610	0.0420300
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	0.0194000	0.0319500
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.0246600	0.0377900
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	-0.0013040	0.0057060
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:dvs_08	-0.0022650	0.0253500
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:is_south	0.0048730	0.0183400
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	-0.0014200	0.0062980
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:distr_chg	-0.0093770	0.0209600
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0004686	0.0044670
5c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. dilution asymmetry, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:initiative	0.0049900	0.0166200
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_worst	0.0060160	0.0123400
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	nash_worst_10	0.0040160	0.0028540
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	0.0169000	0.0229000
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	is_south	0.0098370	0.0108600
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0021290	0.0093360
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0331800	0.0095050
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0094030	0.0067700
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0118600	0.0085460
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0243300	0.0105100
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	0.0009253	0.0082810
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	-0.0003584	0.0015450
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	-0.0017320	0.0103200
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.0057270	0.0077450
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0002390	0.0022990
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0005388	0.0067860
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0005874	0.0016390
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	0.0012430	0.0060970
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0018790	0.0054820
6a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0092410	0.0062900
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_party	-0.0020290	0.0051120
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	nash_party_10	-0.0029730	0.0023190
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	0.0275800	0.0240100
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	is_south	0.0092670	0.0120500
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0012770	0.0118400
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0277000	0.0107700
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0080080	0.0081140
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.0010560	0.0088020
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0010000	0.0006675
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	-0.0005623	0.0059240
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_party:is_south	0.0010080	0.0027090
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0009580	0.0015920
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	-0.0018890	0.0030860
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0007340	0.0010420
6b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_party:initiative	-0.0006851	0.0032620
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty	0.0042890	0.0072500
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	nash_absparty_10	0.0032570	0.0032560
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dvs_08	0.0092850	0.0246400
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	is_south	-0.0025610	0.0113300
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.0040500	0.0107400
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0287000	0.0099270
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0088530	0.0079170
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	initiative	-0.0001895	0.0088620
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	0.0008733	0.0015250
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:dvs_08	0.0003436	0.0072580

(continued)

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:is_south	0.0007699	0.0047870
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	0.0005220	0.0017710
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:distr_chg	-0.0001422	0.0051000
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0005438	0.0012550
6c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Abs. partisan bias, diff. from sims.	dose_absparty:initiative	0.0016350	0.0043540
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_worst	-0.0084610	0.0128300
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	nash_worst_10	0.0007770	0.0034020
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dvs_08	0.0215900	0.0270200
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	is_south	0.0191800	0.0132000
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0039480	0.0111500
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	distr_chg	-0.0056690	0.0111700
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0057370	0.0084240
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	initiative	0.0142800	0.0101200
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0157700	0.0122200
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0180000	0.0101200
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	-0.0002561	0.0016330
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_worst:dvs_08	-0.0021010	0.0107800
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_worst:is_south	0.0062640	0.0078420
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0000513	0.0023610
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0023120	0.0066130
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0000917	0.0017390
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_worst:initiative	0.0004198	0.0068110
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0026090	0.0061130
7a	Main	Maximum	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	0.0005447	0.0065720
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_party	-0.0004320	0.0054090
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	nash_party_10	0.0017190	0.0026300
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dvs_08	0.0246500	0.0241400
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	is_south	0.0174600	0.0132400
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0135700	0.0121200
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	distr_chg	0.0017810	0.0119200
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0022360	0.0082540
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	initiative	0.0124800	0.0092480
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0008847	0.0006934
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_party:dvs_08	0.0005319	0.0056110
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_party:is_south	-0.0014200	0.0028330
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0007715	0.0017540
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_party:distr_chg	-0.0007992	0.0031690
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0000534	0.0010410
7b	Main	Realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_party:initiative	-0.0005997	0.0033180
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_absparty	0.0025580	0.0078680
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	nash_absparty_10	-0.0009406	0.0035270
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dvs_08	0.0137600	0.0266400
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	is_south	0.0127000	0.0121600
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0063890	0.0116400
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	distr_chg	-0.0047880	0.0113300
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0027600	0.0090180
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	initiative	0.0098150	0.0097970
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_absparty:nash_absparty_10	0.0011130	0.0016340
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_absparty:dvs_08	0.0005179	0.0073640
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_absparty:is_south	-0.0035790	0.0051360
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_absparty:log(n_distr_20)	0.0002453	0.0019330
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_absparty:distr_chg	-0.0002042	0.0055930
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_absparty:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0001008	0.0013610
7c	Main	Abs. realized	Nonpartisan	Total partisan harm	dose_absparty:initiative	-0.0015980	0.0045370
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst	0.1970000	0.2576000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	nash_worst_10	0.0017750	0.0068400
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.2492000	0.4719000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	is_south	0.5175000	0.2244000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.2908000	0.2055000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.1026000	0.2144000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.2132000	0.1539000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0913600	0.1781000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.1914000	0.2301000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0528400	0.1724000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0019760	0.0310100
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	-0.0078240	0.2125000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.0513200	0.1535000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0095660	0.0458500
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0602700	0.1260000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0089100	0.0347200
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	-0.0105600	0.1328000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0664100	0.1140000
8a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	0.0684700	0.1294000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst	0.2081000	0.3517000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	nash_worst_10	0.0234800	0.1429000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.7686000	1.2260000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	is_south	0.5644000	0.3083000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.3018000	0.2789000

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Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.1483000	0.2697000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.2464000	0.1972000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0965300	0.2503000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	0.2662000	0.6597000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	0.0167900	0.7626000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0691600	0.4204000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0191200	0.3773000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.2434000	0.5133000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.2693000	0.3269000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.2653000	0.3518000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	0.2169000	0.3110000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	0.1113000	0.3912000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0458200	0.3259000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.1938000	0.3385000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	0.2791000	0.9288000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.3078000	0.3550000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	0.0896200	0.8547000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0407900	0.3105000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0408300	0.2588000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0018830	0.0322300
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	0.0228200	0.2105000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.0361200	0.1797000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0088600	0.0477000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0487700	0.1357000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0073710	0.0364700
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	-0.0251500	0.1577000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_10legislature	0.0094300	0.1300000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1791000	0.3734000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0461700	0.1158000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0071480	0.1320000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0586700	0.2403000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0086340	0.1309000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10no	-0.0147100	0.1256000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10yes	-0.0197800	0.3817000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1127000	0.2925000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0608600	0.1421000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_chg	-0.0247200	0.1274000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0213500	0.1230000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_chg	-0.0399400	0.1704000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.0090100	0.1607000
8a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	0.0517700	0.1410000
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party	0.0255300	0.1055000
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	nash_party_10	0.0432900	0.0434800
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-0.3699000	0.4234000
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	is_south	0.3216000	0.2179000
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.3978000	0.2144000
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.0005986	0.1979000
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.2675000	0.1472000
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0635800	0.1667000
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0235300	0.0138700
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	0.0329300	0.1168000
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:is_south	-0.0268600	0.0637800
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0351200	0.0337600
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0830100	0.0601800
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0116800	0.0196200
8b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:initiative	-0.0011230	0.0615800
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party	0.0159400	0.1423000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	nash_party_10	0.0794800	0.1118000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dvs_08	-1.1000000	1.3390000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	is_south	0.4420000	0.3209000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.3954000	0.2906000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	distr_chg	0.1726000	0.2876000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.3008000	0.2026000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	initiative	0.0030810	0.2569000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_10commission	0.4749000	0.6878000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_10legislature	0.1143000	0.6929000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.1508000	0.5261000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.2267000	0.4499000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.4698000	0.4986000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.2987000	0.3592000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.4288000	0.3413000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_review_10no	0.3091000	0.2759000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_review_10yes	0.1931000	0.3555000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0448500	0.3181000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0708000	0.3044000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_chg	-0.4721000	0.7777000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.1593000	0.3935000

(continued)

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	veto_1_chg	0.3075000	0.7718000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0096830	0.3348000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0939900	0.2516000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0083410	0.0166600
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	0.0133800	0.1185000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:is_south	-0.0067960	0.0629600
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0153200	0.0334700
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0274900	0.0704000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0046230	0.0212800
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:initiative	0.0079980	0.0741300
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_10legislature	0.0035100	0.0507500
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0086240	0.0680900
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0494500	0.0963700
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0111400	0.0553300
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0020210	0.0818900
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0042730	0.0933400
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10no	-0.0285700	0.0608300
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10yes	0.2470000	0.3316000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0064100	0.0635300
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0480800	0.1192000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_chg	0.0337100	0.0371000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0151700	0.0620200
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_chg	0.0164900	0.1819000
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.0195400	0.0741400
8b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seat diff. from sims.	dose_party:court_ctrl_chg	0.0055650	0.0565200
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst	1.7370000	1.4220000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	nash_worst_10	-0.1580000	0.3528000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dvs_08	0.0914900	2.7590000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	is_south	2.4200000	1.3200000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	1.1740000	1.1840000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	distr_chg	-0.9205000	1.1580000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.8670000	0.8881000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	initiative	0.1455000	1.0800000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0284300	1.3350000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0720500	1.0130000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0540400	0.1769000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	0.0820100	1.2040000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.1405000	0.8727000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0154100	0.2666000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	-0.2064000	0.7603000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0517500	0.1932000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	0.0315700	0.7372000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.4493000	0.6399000
9a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	0.1787000	0.7577000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst	0.8063000	1.9280000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	nash_worst_10	0.1674000	0.8376000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dvs_08	-2.2500000	7.6500000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	is_south	2.4970000	1.6540000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	0.9705000	1.6870000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	distr_chg	-0.9986000	1.6220000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.8727000	1.1370000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	initiative	0.4420000	1.4580000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_10commission	1.1540000	3.8840000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_10legislature	0.4513000	4.1830000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.1138000	2.5150000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.4332000	2.1730000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.3854000	3.1580000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-1.0260000	1.9600000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-1.4540000	2.0580000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_review_10no	0.9391000	1.8600000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_review_10yes	1.1130000	2.1820000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0533800	1.8040000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.1152000	1.8290000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_chg	-0.7545000	5.4910000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.7567000	2.1060000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	veto_1_chg	1.4920000	5.0510000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	-1.5870000	1.9090000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	0.1618000	1.5470000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0236600	0.1843000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:dvs_08	0.0537400	1.2560000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:is_south	0.1075000	1.0110000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0061990	0.2590000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:distr_chg	0.0618400	0.7451000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0150200	0.1894000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:initiative	-0.0944700	0.8689000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_10legislature	0.0520900	0.6786000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0166500	2.0600000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.2378000	0.7298000

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Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0265600	0.6568000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.5796000	1.3610000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.2081000	0.7481000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10no	-0.0503000	0.7455000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:court_review_10yes	-0.3072000	2.1050000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.3067000	1.6310000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0997100	0.8359000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_chg	-0.0510700	0.6936000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.1231000	0.7194000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_chg	-0.2672000	0.9517000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.4854000	0.9768000
9a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	0.2632000	0.8324000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party	0.3490000	0.5795000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	nash_party_10	0.2823000	0.2522000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dvs_08	-0.8933000	2.5250000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	is_south	1.2530000	1.2490000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	1.6050000	1.2720000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	distr_chg	-1.0260000	1.1950000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-1.2840000	0.8621000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	initiative	0.1990000	0.9405000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.1208000	0.0773500
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	0.1635000	0.6131000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:is_south	-0.1458000	0.3314000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.1504000	0.1852000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	0.2503000	0.3281000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0587600	0.1161000
9b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:initiative	-0.0591200	0.3716000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party	0.0885300	0.8257000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	nash_party_10	0.7183000	0.6243000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dvs_08	-2.0410000	7.0720000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	is_south	2.1540000	1.7650000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(n_distr_20)	1.1180000	1.6920000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	distr_chg	-0.6927000	1.5810000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.9804000	1.1150000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	initiative	0.0813700	1.5890000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_10commission	1.1320000	3.7830000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_10legislature	0.7087000	3.8750000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.8282000	3.0450000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-1.7220000	2.7190000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	1.4480000	2.9720000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.8070000	2.1610000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-2.3120000	1.8910000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_review_10no	1.3200000	1.5600000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_review_10yes	1.5520000	2.0270000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.7187000	1.9290000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.5591000	1.8650000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_chg	-3.7220000	4.0700000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.1395000	2.3680000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	veto_1_chg	2.5160000	4.2070000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	veto_1_ctrl_chg	-2.1910000	1.8610000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	court_ctrl_chg	0.3362000	1.3820000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0265500	0.1037000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:dvs_08	0.0048320	0.6254000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:is_south	-0.0447600	0.3373000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0451100	0.1936000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0697400	0.4277000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0107100	0.1162000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:initiative	-0.0527600	0.4163000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:drawer_10legislature	0.0242700	0.3197000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0317700	0.4013000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.2850000	0.5353000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0231900	0.3040000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0664100	0.4749000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0036510	0.5515000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10no	-0.1595000	0.3432000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:court_review_10yes	1.0820000	1.7920000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0214900	0.3771000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.1937000	0.6255000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:drawer_chg	0.2238000	0.8184000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0697900	0.3333000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_chg	0.1402000	1.0200000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.2144000	0.4141000
9b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Rep. seats z-score from sims.	dose_party:court_ctrl_chg	0.0701300	0.3092000
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst	0.0119700	0.0294900
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	nash_worst_10	0.0064770	0.0077800
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dvs_08	-0.0181000	0.0655000
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	is_south	-0.0236000	0.0289300

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Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	log(n_distr_20)	0.0285600	0.0262400
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	distr_chg	-0.0288600	0.0267100
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0162300	0.0197400
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	initiative	-0.0009094	0.0239800
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0177000	0.0289200
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0094770	0.0245400
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0006423	0.0036430
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:dvs_08	0.0005287	0.0222700
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:is_south	0.0055280	0.0181000
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	-0.0001990	0.0053050
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:distr_chg	-0.0054070	0.0153600
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0001834	0.0038430
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:initiative	-0.0033830	0.0146000
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0053980	0.0130000
10a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0007579	0.0145300
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst	0.0149800	0.0374500
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	nash_worst_10	0.0113600	0.0173400
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dvs_08	0.0383900	0.1541000
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	is_south	-0.0093040	0.0373500
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	log(n_distr_20)	0.0100500	0.0333200
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	distr_chg	-0.0236500	0.0231640
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0018460	0.0235900
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	initiative	0.0202300	0.0326200
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	drawer_10commission	-0.0398600	0.0760100
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	drawer_10legislature	-0.0466300	0.0877700
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0029790	0.0529200
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0118400	0.0462700
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0408600	0.0649200
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0195200	0.0379800
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0286200	0.0452500
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	court_review_10no	0.0119000	0.0380700
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	court_review_10yes	0.0139900	0.0506400
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0187100	0.0400900
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0095710	0.0400300
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	drawer_chg	0.0674100	0.1092000
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0296000	0.0436800
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	veto_1_chg	0.0443600	0.1024000
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.0045460	0.0400100
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	court_ctrl_chg	0.0018180	0.0314500
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0007761	0.0039360
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:dvs_08	0.0018800	0.0241900
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:is_south	0.0068850	0.0195900
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0008038	0.0051300
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:distr_chg	-0.0024560	0.0159600
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0002674	0.0040840
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:initiative	-0.0047880	0.0170400
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:drawer_10legislature	0.0006844	0.0125300
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0050870	0.0403500
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0008595	0.0140700
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	0.0011630	0.0141100
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0033660	0.0281600
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0015410	0.0147900
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:court_review_10no	0.0017830	0.0143500
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:court_review_10yes	-0.0077380	0.0433800
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0023830	0.0314400
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0006726	0.0161100
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:drawer_chg	0.0022060	0.0142200
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0003261	0.0140000
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:veto_1_chg	0.0041160	0.0188000
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.0086940	0.0192700
10a+	D.2	Maximum	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	0.0002356	0.0161200
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party	-0.0074320	0.0124700
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	nash_party_10	0.0054330	0.0056340
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dvs_08	0.0255200	0.0549900
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	is_south	-0.0096190	0.0286400
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	log(n_distr_20)	0.0065420	0.0273200
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	distr_chg	-0.0161000	0.0264400
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0102500	0.0183300
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	initiative	0.0035230	0.0225300
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0010060	0.0015820
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:dvs_08	0.0001125	0.0122200
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:is_south	-0.0003869	0.0068840
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0015910	0.0036060
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:distr_chg	-0.0011110	0.0070920
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0005297	0.0022020
10b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:initiative	0.0021350	0.0075450
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party	-0.0077500	0.0161500
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	nash_party_10	0.0156200	0.0126700

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Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dvs_08	0.0004551	0.1565000
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	is_south	0.0077770	0.0395100
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	log(n_distr_20)	0.0115000	0.0357900
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	distr_chg	-0.0193100	0.0331900
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0059060	0.0255100
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	initiative	0.0091600	0.0332700
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	drawer_10commission	-0.0154900	0.0818000
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	drawer_10legislature	-0.0248000	0.0817300
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0468800	0.0625900
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0291600	0.0531200
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0071680	0.0622100
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0233500	0.0445200
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0078290	0.0425600
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	court_review_10no	0.0391300	0.0353800
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	court_review_10yes	0.0134500	0.0431400
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0161100	0.0397300
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	-0.0126800	0.0412600
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	drawer_chg	0.0032050	0.0068700
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0034110	0.0503300
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	veto_1_chg	0.0248700	0.0911600
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	veto_1_ctrl_chg	-0.0037430	0.0404400
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	court_ctrl_chg	0.0065460	0.0297600
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0002739	0.0018770
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:dvs_08	-0.0006700	0.0128900
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:is_south	-0.0003699	0.0070250
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0001373	0.0038650
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:distr_chg	-0.0014060	0.0078430
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0003355	0.0022540
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:initiative	0.0005765	0.0088160
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:drawer_10legislature	-0.0001129	0.0061160
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0003330	0.0079370
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:I(drawer_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0024070	0.0111000
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:I(veto_1_10 == "governor")TRUE	-0.0004850	0.0058150
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	0.0007735	0.0099440
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:I(veto_1_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0026830	0.0110400
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:court_review_10no	-0.0015250	0.0065810
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:court_review_10yes	0.0267500	0.0392300
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "democrats")TRUE	-0.0021230	0.0077540
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:I(court_ctrl_10 == "republicans")TRUE	0.0029400	0.0126900
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:drawer_chg	0.0090780	0.0155200
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0017180	0.0066290
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:veto_1_chg	0.0188600	0.0211400
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:veto_1_ctrl_chg	0.0052120	0.0088530
10b+	D.2	Realized	Partisan	Efficiency gap	dose_party:court_ctrl_chg	0.0003025	0.0063950
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_worst	0.0445600	0.0571300
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	nash_worst_10	0.0235200	0.0154100
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dvs_08	0.1754000	0.1233000
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	is_south	-0.0426700	0.0546900
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0392600	0.0508500
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	distr_chg	-0.0137400	0.0535600
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0036050	0.0381200
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	initiative	-0.0414100	0.0479300
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0252100	0.0577100
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0151400	0.0457500
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0008792	0.0072300
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_worst:dvs_08	0.0006755	0.0468900
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_worst:is_south	0.0206300	0.0361100
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	-0.0016360	0.0103500
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_worst:distr_chg	-0.0198300	0.0307300
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0000398	0.0079510
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_worst:initiative	-0.0149800	0.0324200
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0146800	0.0271600
11a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0077220	0.0291400
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_party	-0.0113600	0.0239600
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	nash_party_10	0.0191800	0.0108800
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dvs_08	0.2538000	0.1120000
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	is_south	-0.0482000	0.0576300
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	log(n_distr_20)	-0.0683100	0.0533600
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	distr_chg	0.0038680	0.0534600
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	log(1 + corrupt)	0.0049820	0.0369000
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	initiative	-0.0250800	0.0449500
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_party:nash_party_10	-0.0008413	0.0031880
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_party:dvs_08	-0.0050240	0.0251100
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_party:is_south	0.0113200	0.0135800
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0024730	0.0072910
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0002194	0.0135100
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0013330	0.0046320

(continued)

Model	Spec.	Leeway	Outcome type	Outcome	Coefficient	Estimate	Std. err.
11b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Dilution asymmetry	dose_party:initiative	-0.0002200	0.0136500
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_worst	0.0053120	0.0173900
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	nash_worst_10	-0.0010250	0.0048500
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dvs_08	0.0093200	0.0370400
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	is_south	0.0232300	0.0175700
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	log(n_distr_20)	0.0057490	0.0158700
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	distr_chg	0.0025690	0.0164500
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0103800	0.0118500
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	initiative	-0.0010440	0.0137200
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0081860	0.0174900
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	court_ctrl_chg	0.0073040	0.0134600
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0004456	0.0021440
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_worst:dvs_08	-0.0006892	0.0142000
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_worst:is_south	0.0069280	0.0110900
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	0.0008902	0.0030020
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_worst:distr_chg	-0.0008851	0.0088360
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0007068	0.0022890
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_worst:initiative	-0.0057140	0.0096060
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0006471	0.0075210
12a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	0.0022470	0.0088780
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_party	0.0012560	0.0070460
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	nash_party_10	0.0022960	0.0034260
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	dvs_08	0.0014040	0.0345400
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	is_south	0.0052040	0.0186900
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	log(n_distr_20)	0.0105200	0.0165400
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	distr_chg	0.0017260	0.0166700
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0131000	0.0117400
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	initiative	-0.0008680	0.0131800
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0004034	0.0009187
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_party:dvs_08	0.0010250	0.0077030
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_party:is_south	-0.0003567	0.0038220
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0010450	0.0021800
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0023980	0.0042530
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0005705	0.0013250
12b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Partisan bias	dose_party:initiative	0.0017670	0.0046600
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_worst	0.0229700	0.0199100
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	nash_worst_10	0.0049680	0.0054660
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dvs_08	-0.0364000	0.0447000
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	is_south	0.0188500	0.0198600
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	log(n_distr_20)	0.0147700	0.0166600
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	distr_chg	-0.0239300	0.0178700
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0069340	0.0127300
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	initiative	0.0057160	0.0157100
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	drawer_ctrl_chg	0.0039510	0.0190200
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	court_ctrl_chg	-0.0033760	0.0156600
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_worst:nash_worst_10	0.0006005	0.0027080
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_worst:dvs_08	0.0015510	0.0165200
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_worst:is_south	0.0045290	0.0131700
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_worst:log(n_distr_20)	-0.0000822	0.0036130
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_worst:distr_chg	-0.0044280	0.0113100
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_worst:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0003279	0.0027880
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_worst:initiative	0.0024280	0.0109900
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_worst:drawer_ctrl_chg	-0.0044070	0.0094560
13a	Main	Maximum	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_worst:court_ctrl_chg	-0.0009483	0.0105000
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_party	0.0083270	0.0079720
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	nash_party_10	0.0092440	0.0037520
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dvs_08	-0.0245100	0.0379900
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	is_south	0.0001704	0.0181300
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	log(n_distr_20)	0.0187100	0.0180400
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	distr_chg	-0.0227000	0.0169400
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	log(1 + corrupt)	-0.0094300	0.0123100
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	initiative	0.0082840	0.0146000
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_party:nash_party_10	0.0009613	0.0011300
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_party:dvs_08	0.0017230	0.0090830
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_party:is_south	-0.0009646	0.0050790
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_party:log(n_distr_20)	0.0017850	0.0026850
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_party:distr_chg	0.0027870	0.0049330
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_party:log(1 + corrupt)	0.0005705	0.0015930
13b	Main	Realized	Partisan	Differential partisan harm	dose_party:initiative	-0.0000146	0.0052540

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