Do mixed
member electoral systems provide the ``best of both worlds''? We
examine whether candidates in the proportional representation (PR)
tier of these systems take policy stances closer to their party's
position while candidates in the single member district (SMD) tier
adopt policy positions to appeal to their districts preferences. We
exploit a comprehensive panel survey of all candidates for the
Japanese Upper and Lower House elections between 2003 and 2010 and
estimate the policy positions of each candidate over time using
Bayesian item response theory model. Our analysis suggests that
candidates' policy positions vary substantially within parties. In
addition, the two major parties appear to converge in the economic
policy dimension during this period. In general, we find limited
evidence consistent with the ``best of both worlds'' hypothesis. In
the economic policy dimension, there is tentative evidence that
Lower House SMD candidates are responding to their districts'
preferences while PR candidates are closer to the position of the
median party member. In the main foreign/security policy dimension,
however, SMD candidates are not particularly responsive to their
districts' preferences. (Last revised, August
2011) |