

Using Simulation Algorithms to Analyze and Evaluate Redistricting Plans

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Algorithm-Assisted Redistricting Methodology (ALARM)



ALARM Project


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**Developing methodology and tools
to analyze legislative redistricting.**


- What we do:
 - 1 develop efficient and flexible simulation algorithms
 - 2 build open-source software packages for the entire workflow
 - 3 evaluate redistricting plans in the United States and elsewhere
- Goal: empower researchers, policy makers, data journalists, and citizen data scientists

Redistricting Basics


- Classic gerrymandering strategies: **packing** and **cracking**



Even distribution
2 red, 2 blue



Packing
1 red, 3 blue



Cracking
3 red, 1 blue


- What has changed: availability of granular data and mapping software (e.g., Maptitude)
- US congressional redistricting
 - racial gerrymandering: *Shelby County v. Holder*; *Merrill v. Milligan*
 - partisan gerrymandering: *Rucho v. Common Cause*; *Moore v. Harper*

Why Use Simulation Algorithm for Redistricting Evaluation?

- Traditional redistricting evaluation
 - 1 compute various fairness metrics
 - 2 compare them across states and over time
- Confounded by differences in political geography and redistricting rules
- Simulation-based redistricting evaluation
 - 1 generate many **alternative plans** under a set of redistricting criteria
 - 2 compare them with a proposed plan to evaluate its properties
- Benefits of simulation approach
 - 1 can control for **state-specific** political geography and redistricting rules
 - 2 **transparency** and ability to isolate a relevant factor
 - 3 mathematical properties \rightsquigarrow **representative sample** of alternative plans


Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) Algorithm (McCartan and Imai, 2020)

- Start with a blank state **in parallel**, use the spanning tree approach to sample a district at a time, **resample with weights** at each step






- Advantage: unlike MCMC, sampled plans are nearly independent
- Limitation: hard to incorporate plan-wide or region-specific constraints

Validation



- Divide a 6×6 grid into 3 districts
- Enumerate all 264,000 possibilities
- Party A vote share: compare simulated with enumerated plans



SMC Diagnostics

SMC: 1,000 sampled plans of 11 districts on 2,465 units


`adapt_k_thresh`=0.985 • `seq_alpha`=0.5

`est_label_mult`=1 • `pop_temper`=0.01

Plan diversity 80% range: 0.82 to 0.98


R-hat values for summary statistics:

pop_overlap	comp	dem	e_dem
1.0234	1.0112	1.0053	1.0042



Sampling diagnostics for SMC run 1 of 4 (250 samples)

	Eff. samples (%)	Acc. rate	Log wgt. sd	Max. unique	Est. k
Split 1	242 (97.0%)	20.6%	0.36	245 (98%)	10
Split 2	240 (95.8%)	31.2%	0.43	193 (77%)	6
Split 3	233 (93.4%)	21.8%	0.49	199 (80%)	8
Split 4	231 (92.3%)	29.9%	0.56	196 (78%)	5
Split 5	219 (87.6%)	36.1%	0.62	195 (78%)	3
Split 6	213 (85.0%)	44.9%	0.67	191 (76%)	2
Split 7	224 (89.7%)	15.9%	0.59	189 (76%)	7
Split 8	227 (90.8%)	24.2%	0.59	192 (77%)	4
Split 9	227 (90.9%)	16.9%	0.60	181 (72%)	3
Split 10	228 (91.3%)	3.8%	0.58	174 (70%)	2
Resample	166 (66.4%)	NA%	0.59	183 (73%)	NA



50 State Redistricting Simulations Project




Comprehensive project to simulate alternative congressional redistricting plans for all fifty states.


- tidied 2020 Census plus statewide election data from the VEST
- collect state-specific redistricting requirements
- construct algorithmic constraints based on these and traditional redistricting criteria
- 5,000 simulation plans based on SMC
- code and data are available at the Harvard Dataverse


Check out <https://alarm-redist.org/fifty-states/>

Georgia Example

- 14 Congressional districts
- According to Georgia's House Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment Committee, districts must:
 - 1 be contiguous
 - 2 have equal populations
 - 3 be geographically compact
 - 4 preserve county and municipality boundaries as much as possible
 - 5 avoid the unnecessary pairing of incumbents
- We attempted to account for everything except incumbency constraint
- Voting rights act (VRA) compliance is tricky









Application in the Court: Ohio Congressional Redistricting

- Currently 16 districts: 4 Democrats and 12 Republicans
- After 2020 Census, the number of seats is reduced to 15 districts
- 2018 Ohio voters passed the constitutional amendment
- I served as an expert witness for Relators: *League of Women Voters of Ohio et al. v. Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.*
- Simulation analysis
 - 5,000 alternative plans
 - contiguous and compact districts
 - compliant with the Voting Rights Act (Cleveland)
 - several complicated splitting constraints
 - Section 2(B)(5): out of Ohio's 88 counties,
 - at least 65 counties should not be split
 - no more than 18 counties can be split no more than once
 - no more than 5 counties can be split no more than twice

The Enacted and Example Simulated Plans




Two-party share
30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%




Two-party share
30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%

Compactness




- Polsby-Popper: the ratio of the district area to the area of a circle with the same perimeter
- Edge-removal

Administrative Boundary Splits




Expected Number of Republican Seats




Hamilton County: Cincinnati Area

Enacted plan



Average across simulated plans



Two-party
vote share



60%


50%

40%


30%

Franklin County: Columbus Area


Enacted plan



Average across simulated plans



Two-party
vote share



Ohio Supreme Court Strikes Down the Enacted Map



The Court Opinion

Id. at Section 1(C)(3)(a). The above evidence, particularly Dr. Imai's conclusion that the enacted plan will result in, on average, 2.8 more Republican seats than are warranted, shows that the General Assembly's decision to shift what could have been—under a neutral application of Article XIX—Democratic-leaning areas into competitive districts, i.e., districts that give the Republican Party's candidates a better chance of winning than they would otherwise have had in a more compactly drawn district, resulted in a plan that unduly favors the Republican Party and unduly disfavors the Democratic Party.

Concluding Remarks

- Redistricting matters
 - fair representation and policy outcomes
 - competitiveness of districts and responsiveness
 - political polarization
- Use of algorithms to detect gerrymandering
- Roles of experts
 - legislative process
 - court testimony
- Algorithm-generated redistricting plan proposals
- Japan: 47 prefecture project <https://alarm-redist.org/japan/>