Abstract

Political actors frequently manipulate redistricting plans to gain electoral advantages, a process commonly known as gerrymandering. To address this problem, several states have implemented institutional reforms including the establishment of map-drawing commissions. It is difficult to assess the impact of such reforms because each state structures bundles of complex rules in different ways. We propose to model redistricting processes as a sequential game. The equilibrium solution to the game summarizes multi-step institutional interactions as a single dimensional score. This score measures the leeway political actors have over the partisan lean of the final plan. Using a differences-in-differences design, we demonstrate that reforms reduce partisan bias and increase competitiveness when they constrain partisan actors. We perform a counterfactual policy analysis to estimate the partisan effects of enacting recent institutional reforms nationwide. We find that instituting redistricting commissions generally reduces the current Republican advantage, but Michigan-style reforms would yield a much greater pro-Democratic effect than types of redistricting commissions adopted in Ohio and New York.

Software

redist: redist: Simulation Methods for Legislative Redistricting — CRAN / GitHub

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